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WHISTLING IN THE DARK? CORPORATE FRAUD,
WHISTLEBLOWERS, AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
SARBANES–OXLEY ACT FOR EMPLOYMENT LAW
Miriam A. Cherry∗
Abstract: Passed in 2002 in the wake of the accounting scandals that resulted in billions
of dollars of lost value to shareholders, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act has as its major goal the
prevention of corporate corruption. This Article analyzes the impact of section 806, the
portion of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act that provides protections for employees who report
securities fraud, and describes the effect that Sarbanes–Oxley has on existing employment
law. In addition, this Article contributes to the debate over the general effectiveness of the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act, a topic of contention among both academics and press commentators.
This Article argues that the Act does not go far enough to protect whistleblowers because
employers do not need to specify procedures for acting upon tips that allege financial fraud.
Also, employers most likely can send whistleblowing claims to arbitration, a forum that
weakens the remedies available to employees. Finally, this Article provides a comprehensive
survey of state whistleblowing laws and suggests changes to federal and state law to fill the
gaps that remain after Sarbanes–Oxley.
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As the accounting scandals surrounding Enron and WorldCom
dominated the headlines and business ethics became increasingly
suspect, two whistleblowers became symbols of integrity to the
American public. Indeed, Sherron Watkins and Cynthia Cooper were
among “The Whistleblowers” named as Time magazine’s “Persons of
the Year” for 2002.2 At significant risk to their careers, financial wellbeing, and mental health, Cooper and Watkins alerted high-level
executives at their respective companies to accounting fraud.3
Unfortunately, most whistleblowers take all these risks when they report
illegal activities occurring within their organizations.4 The magnitude of
these recent frauds is startling and, unfortunately, appears to be
indicative of a widespread problem.5 One study by a prominent
accounting firm estimated that companies lose twenty percent of every
dollar earned due to some form of workplace fraud.6
In response to the corporate scandals of 2002, Congress enacted the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act (the Act)7 to prevent future corporate corruption
and securities fraud.8 The Act contains a provision, § 806,9 that aims to
2. Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 30. Sherron
Watkins remarked that she had several similarities with the two other whistleblowers: all three are
women, all three were working as primary wage-earners, and all three grew up in small towns.
Interview with Sherron Watkins in Birmingham, Ala. (Feb. 18, 2004).
3. Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 2, at 30.
4. According to a study of eighty-four whistleblowers conducted in the early 1990s, “82%
experienced harassment after blowing the whistle, 60% were fired, 17% lost their homes, and 10%
admitted to attempted suicide.” David Culp, Whistleblowers: Corporate Anarchists or Heroes?
Towards a Judicial Perspective, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 113 (1995). For a fuller
description of the risks accompanying whistleblowing, see infra Part I.B.3.
5. See Ernst & Young, American Workers: Employers Lose 20 Percent of Every Dollar to
Workplace Fraud (Aug. 4, 2002), at http://www.ey.com/global/Content.nsf/US/Media_-_Release__08-05-02DC (last visited Oct. 7, 2004).
6. See id. The study was based on a telephone survey of 617 workers. Id.; see also Stephanie
Armour, More Companies Urge Workers to Blow the Whistle, USA TODAY, Dec. 16, 2002, at B1
(reporting a trend toward whistleblowing as a method of curtailing workplace fraud). Of course,
“fraud in the workplace” can mean a type of theft that is as trivial as making a personal copy at
work or taking five extra minutes on a break. The type of fraud that appears to be most damaging
and devastating is that perpetrated by individuals at the top of the organizational hierarchy—the
magnitude of these frauds is greater because of the institutional trust given to leaders of an
organization. See generally GERARD M. ZACK, FRAUD AND ABUSE IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:
A GUIDE TO PREVENTION AND DETECTION 20 (2003) (describing frauds and fraud-prevention
techniques in the context of non-profit organizations).
7. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2003)).
8. Paul Beckett, Executives Face Harsh Sanctions in Corporate-Governance Law, WALL ST. J., July
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protect whistleblowers such as Cooper and Watkins who report
accounting fraud.10 Most of the current scholarship on Sarbanes–Oxley
focuses on the § 30711 ethics rules that have been proposed to address a
lawyer’s behavior when he or she is presented with knowledge of a
client’s falsification of financial results (the so-called “noisy
withdrawal” or “lawyer-as-whistleblower” provisions).12 This Article
instead examines the provisions of Sarbanes–Oxley that cover all
workers at publicly traded companies who “blow the whistle” on suspect
accounting practices, whether that whistleblowing is done within the
organization, to government agencies, or as part of a shareholder

31, 2002, at C7. Since the enactment of Sarbanes–Oxley, accounting fraud continues to dominate
the headlines. Recent news stories have focused on HealthSouth, which overstated its earnings by
approximately $2.5 billion over a period of seven years. Greg Farrell, House Joins Justice, SEC in
HealthSouth Scrutiny, USA TODAY, Apr. 23, 2003, at 2B. U.S. Representative James Greenwood,
chair of the congressional subcommittee currently investigating HealthSouth, stated that in addition
to the accounting fraud, “some of these financial dealings between board members raise serious
questions . . . . I can’t wait to hear what these guys say under oath. Whose interests were they
looking after, their own or the shareholders’?” Id.; see also Carrick Mollenkamp & Chad Terhune,
Scrushy Indicted on Fraud Charges: HealthSouth’s Former Chief Faces 85 Criminal Counts Tied to
$2.7 Billion Scheme, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2003, at A3. It is difficult to tell precisely why so much
corporate fraud is now coming to light, but one anecdotal explanation is that, in the aftermath of the
internet bubble, the stock market decline, and the recession, fraud has simply become more difficult
to hide. See Thomas Wardell, The Current State of Play Under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 28
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 935, 936 (2003) (positing that the crash was at least partially due to
unorthodox methods of measuring the success and profitability of “new economy” companies).
9. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802–04 (codified at 18
U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West Supp. 2003)).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 307 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West Supp. 2003)).
12. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (2003) (describing legal ethics issues for transactional lawyers under
Sarbanes–Oxley); Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing
Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097 (2003) (describing fraud at Enron and analyzing lawyer-aswhistleblower rules); Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the
SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236 (2003) (describing legal ethics issues for transactional lawyers
under Sarbanes–Oxley); Darlene M. Robertson & Anthony A. Tortora, Reporting Requirements for
Lawyers Under Sarbanes–Oxley: Has Congress Really Changed Anything?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 785 (2003) (same). In contrast, virtually nothing has been written about § 806. The
practitioner-oriented pieces that have appeared focus on the elements of a whistleblowing claim. See
Michael Delikat, Whistleblowing, Retaliation and Sarbanes–Oxley, in 2 32ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE
ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 2003, at 905, 925 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series
No. H-697, 2003) (containing description of elements of claims for practitioners); William R.
McLucas & Mark M. Oh, Whistleblowing: Protection of Corporate Officials and Employees Who
Provide Evidence of Fraud Under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
2004, at 61, 63 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1411, 2003)
(describing procedures for bringing claim).
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lawsuit. This Article discusses the few publicized cases that have been
brought under § 806 to date.13 In discussing the whistleblower
provisions, this Article uses an employment law perspective to examine
the changes that Sarbanes–Oxley makes to existing state retaliatory
discharge laws.
“Traditional” whistleblowing doctrine has long been the province of
individual states, and as such, legal protection for whistleblowers has
been largely decentralized and uneven.14 An initial examination of the
whistleblowing provisions of the Act suggests that the new law
ameliorates this traditional unevenness. However, a further and fuller
analysis reveals that the lack of remedies provided in the Act results in a
less effective scheme for encouraging whistleblowing than it would
initially seem. Further, even after the enactment of Sarbanes–Oxley
there are significant gaps in retaliatory discharge law. For example,
while Sarbanes–Oxley does contain criminal provisions that cover
retaliation against whistleblowers at all workplaces,15 plaintiffs have a
private right of action under § 806 only if their employer is a publicly
traded company.16 Therefore, it would appear that Sarbanes–Oxley
incrementally changes both securities law and employment law, rather
than radically overhauling either field. Accordingly, one might ask
whether § 806 is substantive or merely “whistling in the dark.”17
13. Recently, an administrative law judge ruled in favor of a chief financial officer who claims that
he had been fired for raising various concerns regarding the issuer’s financial statements, including
the chief executive officer’s insider trading. Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 2003-SOX-15
(Dep’t
of
Labor
Jan.
28,
2004),
available
at
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/wblower/decsn/03sox15c.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2004). The
interpretations that this particular case gives to provisions of the Act will be discussed throughout
the Article. Another such whistleblowing case is being litigated in federal court in Texas. Murray v.
TXU Corp., 279 F. Supp. 2d 799, 799 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (allowing suit to proceed despite
defendant’s challenge to procedure and timing). The Murray case involves a high-level executive at
an energy trading company who alleges that he was fired for raising internal concerns about
earnings manipulation, lack of meaningful financial disclosures, and false and misleading
statements by the company’s management. Id.; see Sudeep Reddy, TXU Denies Ex-VP’s
Allegations: Utility Submits First Detailed Response to Whistleblower’s Suit, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Sept. 17, 2003, at 2D. For discussion of a contrasting Sarbanes–Oxley whistleblower case
that was sent to mandatory arbitration rather than to court, see this Article’s discussion of Boss v.
Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). See infra notes 362–376 and
accompanying text.
14. See infra Part I.B.1.
15. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 1107 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513 (West Supp. 2003)).
16. See id. § 806 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West. Supp. 2003)).
17. The tension within the doctrine surrounding whistleblowing arises from the economic analysis
that underlies so many areas of employment law—legal rules should encourage the socially optimal
amount of whistleblowing activity, no more and no less. With too little whistleblowing activity, we
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This Article examines whether, overall, Sarbanes–Oxley is a radical
departure that will drastically change securities law and corporate
governance, or whether it merely gives the appearance of change while
leaving the status quo in place. As one commentator put it, Sarbanes–
Oxley “is not major reform, but patches and codifications and further
study. It is a restatement with the force of federal law.”18 Based on
analysis of the whistleblowing provisions, this Article largely concurs
and concludes that Sarbanes–Oxley is a compromise half-measure and
not the true reform our securities laws need to respond to corporate
fraud.
Part I of this Article examines whistleblower protections before the
passage of Sarbanes–Oxley. It includes the stories of the two recent
whistleblowers on corporate fraud, Watkins and Cooper, and analyzes
their legal situations prior to the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act.
This section also describes the status of state and federal protections for
whistleblowers before the passage of the Act and the sociological
implications of whistleblowing. The next section, Part II, describes and
analyzes the various provisions of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, including an
in-depth analysis of the Act and regulations pertaining to
whistleblowing. Part III considers the overall effectiveness of the Act.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that Congress should have gone
further to protect whistleblowers in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and
are left with sycophants who will agree to go on midnight toxic-dumping sprees, tell the Jeff
Skillings of the world what they want to hear about ever-more-fraudulent related-party transactions,
and allow polluted water into healing baths. On the other hand, with too much whistleblowing, we
are left with organizations hobbled by internal strife. The same sort of tension between over- and
under- reporting exists in other areas as well, and these same debates have gone on for years in
terms of the reporting of racial and sexual harassment. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992).
18. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes–Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and it
Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 987 (2003) (emphasis omitted). In this analysis, I largely
concur with Cunningham’s article, which describes the Sarbanes–Oxley Act as containing
“sweeping punts and stunts,” but also as an Act that contains “potentially profound” provisions. Id.
at 918–19. Cunningham states that “[i]ncremental provisions of the Act are best seen as patchwork
responses to precise transgressions present in the popularized scandals—legislative action akin to
the frequently maligned military strategist fighting the last war rather than planning for the next.”
Id. At the same time, however, I disagree with Cunningham’s brief assessment of whistleblowing
under Sarbanes–Oxley, as he seems to provide an overly optimistic view of the strength of state
whistleblowing laws. See id. at 965–66. Another commentator remarked that, while “no panacea,”
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act should be applauded for its steps to minimize conflicts of interest and for
the publicity it is giving to business ethics. Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40
AM. BUS. L.J. 417, 442–43 (2003). Both of these points are important, Prentice argues, as they may
affect behavior—not just rational behavior under the law and economics school of thought, but also
behavior limited by bounded rationality and other such constraints. Id. at 443–44.
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legislators should amend various federal and state laws to fill in the gaps
that make whistleblowers vulnerable to retaliation.
I.

THE STATUS QUO: WHISTLEBLOWING LAW BEFORE
SARBANES–OXLEY

A.

Two Whistleblowers in Action: The Cases of WorldCom and Enron

Sherron Watkins and Cynthia Cooper played instrumental roles in
exposing corporate fraud at their respective companies. While Watkins’s
whistleblowing activity would not have been protected under Texas law
prior to the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act,19 Cooper’s
whistleblowing would have been protected under Mississippi law.20
There is, however, no principled distinction that can be drawn between
their two situations. Given the extent of the frauds and the problems that
such accounting scandals created, these two situations justify a uniform
federal system, such as that embodied by Sarbanes–Oxley.
1.

Sherron Watkins Alerts Executives at Enron of Fraud

Sherron Watkins, trained as an accountant, had worked for Andrew
Fastow, Enron’s chief financial officer, for nearly a decade in various
capacities.21 During 2001 and 2002, Watkins, then a vice president at
Enron, was charged with examining Enron’s books to find assets that the
company could sell in response to the stock market decline.22 As she was
assessing sale values, Watkins began finding “mystery assets”23 and
“fuzzy off-the-books arrangements that seemed to be backed by nothing
more than . . . deflated Enron stock.”24 When she asked questions, no
one cared or seemed to be able to explain the arrangements.25 The more
19. See Austin v. HealthTrust, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. 1998); Winters v. Houston
Chronicle Publ’g Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex. 1990) (refusing to recognize “cause of action for
private employees who are discharged for reporting illegal activities”); cf. Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v.
Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 734 (Tex. 1985) (creating “very narrow exception to the employment-atwill doctrine,” but requiring plaintiff “to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his
discharge was for no reason other than his refusal to perform an illegal act”).
20. See McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626 So. 2d 603, 607 (Miss. 1993).
21. See SWARTZ & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 269.
22. See id.
23. Sherron Watkins, Address at Samford University (Feb. 19, 2004).
24. Jodie Morse & Amanda Bower, The Party Crasher, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 55.
25. Id.
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she learned, the more Watkins became “highly alarmed” because her
“understanding as an accountant [was] that a company could never use
its own stock to generate a gain or avoid a loss on its income
statement.”26 However, Watkins felt that bringing her concerns either to
Fastow or to Jeffrey Skilling, Enron’s then-chief executive officer,
“would have been a job terminating move.”27
Concluding that “accounting should just not be that creative,”
Watkins began looking for a job outside Enron.28 As she was in the
process of looking for a position with another company, Skilling
abruptly resigned, and Kenneth Lay, the chairman of the board, asked
employees to drop suggestions in a comment box.29 Watkins composed a
now-famous anonymous letter warning that the accounting for certain
transactions had been too aggressive.30 The letter voiced her concern
about improprieties and violations of accounting standards.31 Soon after
26. Financial Collapse of Enron Corp.: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations, 107th Cong. 15 (2002) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Sherron Watkins).
27. Id.
28. Sherron Watkins, Address at Samford University (Feb. 19, 2004).
29. Morse & Bower, supra note 24, at 55; Interview with Sherron Watkins in Birmingham, Ala.
(Feb. 18, 2004).
30. SWARTZ & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 275.
31. The letter, which has been widely reprinted, reads as follows:
Dear Mr. Lay,
Has Enron become a risky place to work? For those of us who didn’t get rich over the last few
years, can we afford to stay?
Skilling’s abrupt departure will raise suspicions of accounting improprieties and valuation
issues. Enron has been very aggressive in its accounting—most notably the Raptor transactions
and the Condor vehicle. We do have valuation issues with our international assets and possibly
some of our EES MTM positions.
The spotlight will be on us, the market just can’t accept that Skilling is leaving his dream job. I
think that the valuation issues can be fixed and reported with other goodwill write-downs to
occur in 2002. How do we fix the Raptor and Condor deals? They unwind in 2002 and 2003,
we will have to pony up Enron stock and that won’t go unnoticed.
To the layman on the street, it will look like we recognized fund flows of $800 mm from
merchant asset sales in 1999 by selling to a vehicle (Condor) that we capitalized with a
promise of Enron stock in later years. Is that really funds flow or is it cash from equity
issuance?
We have recognized over $550 million of fair value gains on stocks via our swaps with Raptor,
much of that stock has declined significantly—Avici by 98%, from $178 mm to $5 mm, The
New Power Co by 70%, from $20/share to $6/share. The value in the swaps won’t be there for
Raptor, so once again Enron will issue stock to offset these losses. Raptor is an LJM entity. It
sure looks to the layman on the street that we are hiding losses in a related company and will
compensate that company with Enron stock in the future.
I am incredibly nervous that we will implode in a wave of accounting scandals. My 8 years of
Enron work history will be worth nothing on my resume, the business world will consider the
past successes as nothing but an elaborate accounting hoax. Skilling is resigning now for
“personal reasons” but I think he wasn’t having fun, looked down the road and knew this stuff
was unfixable and would rather abandon ship now than resign in shame in 2 years.
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writing the letter, Watkins arranged a meeting with Lay in which she
expressed her concerns and was told that there would be an investigation
into the points she raised.32
Months later, the Enron bankruptcy and fraud became well
publicized. Indeed, Fastow and other executives had arranged for Enron
to “hedge” with private partnerships, with many of the transactions
backed only by Enron stock.33 Watkins was called to testify about this
scheme before Congress.34 In the process of preparing for her testimony,
Watkins reviewed an e-mail message from Enron’s outside counsel,
Vinson & Elkins, which discussed the state of Texas whistleblowing
law.35 This message read, in part, “[p]er your request . . . the following
are some bullet thoughts on how to manage the case with the employee
who made the sensitive report . . . . Texas law does not currently protect
corporate whistle-blowers.”36 Watkins realized that the e-mail was in
reference to her, as it was dated only two days after she met with Lay.37
The legal implication of this e-mail message is clear. Evidently,
someone at a high level of the company wanted to fire Watkins because
of her willingness to come forward and discuss the accounting
improprieties. As Watkins put it, “I found out . . . that Ken Lay’s first
action was not to look at my concerns [about fraudulent accounting] but
Is there a way our accounting guru’s [sic] can unwind these deals now? I have thought and
thought about how to do this, but I keep bumping into one big problem—we booked the
Condor and Raptor deals in 1999 and 2000, we enjoyed a wonderfully high stock price, many
executives sold stock, we then try and reverse or fix the deals in 2001 and it’s a bit like robbing
the bank in one year and trying to pay it back 2 years later. Nice try, but investors were hurt,
they bought at $70 and $80/share looking for $120/share and now they’re at $38 or worse. We
are under too much scrutiny and there are probably one or two disgruntled “redeployed”
employees who know enough about the “funny” accounting to get us in trouble.
What do we do? I know this question cannot be addressed in the all employee meeting, but can
you give some assurances that you and Causey will sit down and take a good hard objective
look at what is going to happen to Condor and Raptor in 2002 and 2003?
Id. at 361–62.
32. Id. at 287.
33. Michael L. Fox, To Tell or Not to Tell: Legal Ethics and Disclosure After Enron, 2002 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 867, 870–80. In this instance, it was not hedging alone that was the problem. A
“hedge” is often used to control the amount of risk to which an investor or an entity is subjected
based on a downturn in the market. This explains the nature of hedge funds, which are
countercyclical to the business cycle. The problem with Enron’s hedging was that it used its own
assets. Not only does this violate various accounting rules, but instead of minimizing risk, it actually
increases the amount of risk. See SWARTZ & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 228–34 (describing creation
of Raptor entities for hedging purposes).
34. SWARTZ & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 352–53.
35. Morse & Bower, supra note 24, at 53.
36. Id.; see SWARTZ & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 291.
37. SWARTZ & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 291.
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to see if they could dump me on the street.”38 In her view, Enron
executives asked outside counsel to research the status of Texas
whistleblower law so that Enron could fire her without employment law
liability.39
Indeed, the e-mail embodied an accurate legal opinion because Texas
law at that time would have allowed Lay to fire Watkins with no liability
or legal consequence for Enron. In Austin v. HealthTrust, Inc.,40 the
Supreme Court of Texas refused to recognize a retaliatory discharge
cause of action based on an employee’s report of illegal activity at a
private company (as opposed to a government employer).41 Before
Enron was able to fire Watkins, however, the scandals about the
fraudulent transactions came to light and Enron’s financial practices
were subjected to scrutiny by its shareholders, Congress, and the
American public.
The unraveling of the Enron saga continues.42 Currently, one Enron
ex-treasurer, Ben Glisan, is in federal prison serving a five-year sentence
that he received after pleading guilty to one count of conspiring to
commit fraud.43 Fastow, who originally maintained his innocence,44
entered a guilty plea in exchange for a ten-year prison sentence and has
now agreed to cooperate with law enforcement.45 Prosecutors recently
filed a forty-two-count indictment against Skilling, who pleaded not
guilty and is currently free on a $5 million bond.46 Former Chief

38. Sherron Watkins, Address at Samford University (Feb. 19, 2004).
39. Id.
40. 967 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. 1998).
41. Id. at 403 (refusing to recognize action for whistleblowing where nurse was allegedly retaliated
against for reporting a co-worker who was endangering patients through substance abuse and illegal
distribution of prescription drugs); see also Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co., 795 S.W.2d
723, 724 (Tex. 1990) (refusing to recognize “cause of action for private employees who are
discharged for reporting illegal activities”); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 734
(Tex. 1985) (creating “very narrow exception to the employment-at-will doctrine,” but requiring
plaintiff “to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his discharge was for no reason other
than his refusal to perform an illegal act”).
42. See Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to Worldcom and Beyond: Life and Crime After
Sarbanes–Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 357 nn.2–3 (2003) (listing indictments and pending
criminal actions against Enron officers and executives).
43. John R. Emshwiller, Ex-Treasurer Is First Enron Officer to Go to Prison, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11,
2003, at A3.
44. Id.
45. John R. Emshwiller, Enron Probe Shifts Its Focus to Lay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2004, at A3.
46. John R. Emshwiller & Alexei Barrionuevo, U.S. Prosecutors File Indictment Against Skilling,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2004, at A1.
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Accounting Officer Richard Causey is also awaiting trial.47 Meanwhile,
a federal grand jury indicted three Merrill Lynch executives on fraud
charges arising from a sham transaction that allowed Enron to record
$12 million in earnings based on the ostensible purchase of Nigerian
barges.48 Last, but certainly not least, Lay himself has been indicted by a
grand jury and faces civil charges from the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) that could force him to disgorge his earnings from
the sale of Enron stock and return those gains to investors.49
Enron, at one time the seventh largest publicly traded company on the
New York Stock Exchange and a pioneer in new economy energy
trading, now trades only as a penny stock.50 Enron’s stock certificates
are currently sold for their historical and artistic value rather than for the
worth of the company that the certificates represent.51 The multicolored
sign “E” that stood outside Enron’s office, symbol of a once-proud
corporation, is now better known as the “crooked ‘E,’” a symbol of
corporate corruption.52
2.

Cynthia Cooper Uncovers WorldCom’s Massive Accounting Fraud

In March of 2002, Cynthia Cooper, the head of internal auditing at
WorldCom, heard a disturbing report about WorldCom’s accounting
from an executive in the wireless division, who maintained that
WorldCom used certain reserves to boost its revenue.53 When Cooper
brought the matter to the attention of outside auditor Arthur Andersen,
she was told that the accounting treatment was not a problem and could

47. Id.
48. John R. Emshwiller & Ann Davis, Merrill Takes Enron Responsibility, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18,
2003, at A3.
49. John R. Emshwiller et al., Lay Is Indicted as Enron Inquiry Reaches the Top, WALL ST. J.,
July 8, 2004, at A1; Mary Flood, For Ken Lay, His “Worst Nightmare,” HOUSTON CHRON., Oct.
20, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WL 83673862 (reporting that Ken Lay, Jeffrey Skilling, and
Richard Causey will be tried together).
50. Diya Gullapalli, Estate Taxes Muddy Comparisons, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2004, at C3; Jeff D.
Opdyke, More Blue Chips Hit the Pink Sheets, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2003, at D1 (describing how
the penny stock exchange works and its reputation as “notorious for distressed companies and
dubious penny stocks”).
51. A visit to the website eBay, http://www.ebay.com, on Oct. 7, 2004, confirmed that Enron stock
certificates are worth more as art or as a symbol of a once high-flying company than they are as
securities qua securities.
52. Digits: What About the ‘E’?, WALL ST. J., Sept.12, 2002, at B8.
53. Susan Pulliam & Deborah Solomon, Uncooking the Books: How Three Unlikely Sleuths
Discovered Fraud at WorldCom, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2002, at A1.
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be ignored.54 When she raised the issue with WorldCom Chief Financial
Officer Scott Sullivan, he became angry.55 Still concerned about the
incident as well as other potential accounting irregularities, Cooper and
her team of auditors secretly logged into the company’s computer
system at night to check the accuracy of the accounts.56
What Cooper and her employees found was shocking. In May of
2002, they discovered that WorldCom had treated operating costs as
capital expenditures.57 While operating costs (such as salaries) are to be
subtracted from income during the quarter, capital costs are major
purchases (such as equipment or property) that can be spread out over
time.58 By falsely reclassifying operating costs as capital expenditures in
violation of accounting rules, WorldCom looked far more profitable in
its financial reporting than it actually was.59
That June, after her team turned up over $2 billion of suspect
accounting entries, Cooper informed the board’s audit committee of her
findings.60 After giving Sullivan a weekend to explain the accounting
treatment, which he could not do, the audit committee fired him.61 Soon
thereafter, WorldCom was forced to admit that it had inflated its profits
by $3.9 billion.62 The truth was revealed in newspaper accounts, SEC
filings, and congressional hearings: top management had directed
several accountants to compensate for earnings short-falls at the end of
each quarter when results were due by reclassifying operating costs as
capital expenditures.63
Two external investigations released in 2003 document the extent of

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see LYNNE W. JETER, DISCONNECTED: DECEIT AND BETRAYAL AT WORLDCOM 168–73
(2003).
58. See Susan Pulliam, Over the Line: A Staffer Ordered to Commit Fraud Balked, Then Caved,
WALL ST. J., June 23, 2003, at A6.
59. Id.
60. Pulliam & Solomon, supra note 53, at A6.
61. Id.
62. Andrew Hill, Whistleblowers’ Early Warning on WorldCom, FIN. TIMES, July 15, 2002, at 16.
63. Julian Borger & Richard Wray, How Auditor Found $4bn Black Hole: Corporate Fraud
Uncovered by Second Female Whistleblower, GUARDIAN, June 28, 2002, at 3; Pulliam, supra note
58, at A6; Questioning the Books: An Internal Auditor Saddened by Finding, WALL ST. J., June 28,
2002, at A9; Jared Sandberg & Deborah Solomon, Key Officials at WorldCom Going to the Hill,
WALL ST. J., July 8, 2002, at A17.
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the fraud.64 These investigations reveal that WorldCom kept two sets of
books and that there were numerous failures in the company’s corporate
governance structure.65 In addition to the switches surrounding capital
expenses and operating costs, the company also manipulated revenues,
depreciation reserves, and even taxes.66 Sullivan and four other
WorldCom executives and employees face criminal charges for
orchestrating the $3.8 billion fraud.67 The Oklahoma Attorney General
has indicted former Chief Executive Officer Bernard Ebbers, who was in
charge of the company when the massive fraud took place and knew
about the exaggerated numbers at the end of each quarter.68 Ebbers also
may face federal charges.69
According to The Wall Street Journal, “[o]ne of the reports said while
dozens of people knew about the fraud, it remained hidden from public
view because employees were afraid to speak out.”70 Although Cooper
has kept her position at WorldCom, reporting the fraud took a heavy
personal toll.71 Even though Cooper did not perpetuate the fraud, many
at the company blamed her for her discovery.72 The fraud led to massive
layoffs and WorldCom’s subsequent bankruptcy.73
In contrast to Sherron Watkins, whose whistleblowing would have
been unprotected in Texas,74 Mississippi state law likely would have
protected Cooper.75 In a 1993 decision, McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix
Co.,76 the Mississippi State Supreme Court created a public policy

64. See Rebecca Blumenstein & Susan Pulliam, WorldCom Fraud Was Widespread: Ebbers, Many
Executives Conspired to Falsify Results in Late 1990s, Probes Find, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2003, at
A3.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Pulliam & Solomon, supra note 53, at A1.
68. See Rebecca Blumenstein & Susan Pulliam, WorldCom Report Finds Ebbers Played Role in
Inflating Revenue, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2003, at A1.
69. Brickey, supra note 42, at 358 n.4.
70. Blumenstein & Pulliam, supra note 64, at A3.
71. Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 2, at 30.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Austin v. HealthTrust, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. 1998).
75. I have assumed for purposes of this Article that if, hypothetically, adverse employment action
had been taken against Cooper, she would have brought an action under Mississippi whistleblower
laws. WorldCom’s corporate headquarters were in Mississippi, and that is where Cooper worked
during her entire tenure with WorldCom. See JETER, supra note 57, at 167–68.
76. 626 So. 2d 603 (Miss. 1993).
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exception to the at-will employment rule for whistleblowers.77 Cooper
and Watkins each had to make a choice about whether to confront
wrongdoing and report fraud. Yet Watkins, facing this dilemma in
Texas, could have been fired without legal recourse, whereas Mississippi
law protected Cooper from that fate.78 These two instances highlight the
inconsistencies in state law that existed prior to the passage of Sarbanes–
Oxley.
B.

Legal Status Quo: The Vagaries of Whistleblowing Law

This section summarizes state and federal whistleblowing laws prior
to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Under traditional common law, most
jurisdictions provided no legal redress for employees whose employers
terminated them in retaliation for their whistleblowing.79 Increasingly,
jurisdictions are moving from this legal regime to one that protects
individuals who report wrongdoing at work.80 However, the law has
developed somewhat haphazardly.81 As illustrated by the examples of
Sherron Watkins and Cynthia Cooper, whether an employee can bring a
successful case often depends on the state in which the employee blows
the whistle.
1.

State Public Policy Decisions and Whistleblower Statutes

Under the common law of various states, whistleblowing cases—
sometimes classified as retaliatory discharge, discharge in contravention
of public policy, or wrongful discharge—have received, and continue to
receive, inconsistent treatment.82 An action for wrongful discharge is an
exception to the traditional employment at-will doctrine.83 Under the atwill doctrine, an employer can hire and fire employees for a good

77. Id. at 607.
78. Compare Austin, 967 S.W.2d at 403, with McArn, 626 So. 2d at 607.
79. HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (Albany,
N.Y., John D. Parsons, Jr. 1877).
80. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower
Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 107–08 (2000).
81. See App. A, infra pp. 1087–1120 for a compilation of whistleblower protections by state.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385 (Ark. 1988) (“[W]e hold that an
at-will employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge if he or she is fired in violation of a
well-established public policy of the state. This is a limited exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine.”).
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reason, any reason, or no reason at all; in parallel, employees can quit for
a good reason, any reason, or no reason at all.84 As the common law
developed, however, courts deemed certain reasons to be against public
policy, such as firing an employee for refusing to give perjured
testimony to a state investigatory committee85 or for serving as a juror.86
From these initial limited public policy exceptions, courts in some
jurisdictions began fashioning rudimentary protection for employees
who reported illegal actions that occurred at work.87 Courts in early
decisions reasoned that an employee should not be fired for refusing to
violate a law or government regulation or for revealing such a
violation.88 One detects in the cases a certain hesitancy by the courts to
intrude into the “private” decision to discharge an employee.89 At the
84. Development of the at-will doctrine is usually attributed to a 125-year-old treatise by Horace G.
Wood. WOOD, supra note 79, at 272. For a useful discussion of the rule, as well as its benefits and
drawbacks, see PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 56–63 (1990).
85. Indeed, the genesis of whistleblowing doctrine is often traced to a case about perjured
testimony. In Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, the court, after establishing that plaintiff had a
cause of action for wrongful discharge when he was fired for refusing to commit perjury, stated:
To hold that one’s continued employment could be made contingent upon his commission of a
felonious act at the instance of his employer would be to encourage criminal conduct upon the
part of both the employee and employer and would serve to contaminate the honest
administration of public affairs. This is patently contrary to the public welfare.
344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
86. See Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975) (creating exception to the employment-at-will
rule and allowing plaintiff to recover when she was dismissed for serving on a jury). The court also
stated, “[i]f an employer were permitted with impunity to discharge an employee for fulfilling her
obligation of jury duty, the jury system would be adversely affected. The will of the community
would be thwarted.” Id.
87. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kreiser’s Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225, 228 (S.D. 1988) (holding that employee
engaged in protected activity in reporting corporate president’s conversion of company property to
own use).
88. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1335–37 (Cal. 1980) (holding that
employee fired after refusing to participate in employer’s illegal scheme stated cause of action for
wrongful discharge); Johnson, 433 N.W.2d at 228 (holding that employee engaged in protected
activity in reporting corporate president’s conversion of company property to own use).
89. See Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 387–88 (Conn. 1980):
We are mindful that courts should not lightly intervene to impair the exercise of managerial
discretion or to foment unwarranted litigation. We are, however, equally mindful that the
myriad of employees without the bargaining power to command employment contracts for a
definite term are entitled to a modicum of judicial protection when their conduct as good
citizens is punished by their employers.
Id.; Harless v. First Nat’l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (W. Va. 1978):
[T]he rule giving the employer the absolute right to discharge an at-will employee must be
tempered by the further principle that where the employer’s motivation for the discharge
contravenes some substantial public policy principle, then the employer may be liable to the
employee for damages occasioned by the discharge.
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same time, however, many courts overcame this hesitancy by focusing
on the legal violations that took place. To allow employers to direct their
employees to break the law, to fire employees if they refused to comply,
and then to deny the discharged employee any kind of legal redress
would be tantamount to encouraging employers to break the law.90
Instead of relying on public policy, other courts fashioned remedies for
aggrieved employees by implying a contractual duty of good faith and
fair dealing into the at-will employment relationship.91 Not all state
courts, however, have recognized a cause of action for such a retaliatory
discharge.92 In many jurisdictions, such as Texas, where Sherron
Watkins would likely have had her case heard if Enron had fired her,
courts have refused to fashion such a public policy exception to the atwill rule.93
Although academics have soundly criticized the employment at-will
rule, and debate over the rule’s wisdom continues, it is the default rule in
all but one American jurisdiction.94 Currently, only Montana has
abrogated the rule and adopted a for-cause termination statute.95
However, the trend among the other forty-nine states has been to temper
the at-will rule somewhat.96 State legislatures, state courts, and Congress
have increasingly encroached upon the at-will rule by providing some
employees a limited level of job security based on public policy

90. See, e.g., Beasley v. Affiliated Hosp. Prods., 713 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
(involving employee who refused to determine outcome of raffle, which would have violated state
law).
91. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974) (implying duty of good
faith into contract of employment that was terminable at will).
92. See App. A, infra pp. 1087–1120.
93. See Austin v. HealthTrust, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. 1998); App. A, infra pp. 1115–16.
94. As the published writings on the employment-at-will rule are far too voluminous to encapsulate
in a solitary footnote, the following is only a sample of the types of scholarship available. See, e.g.,
Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of “Just Cause” in Employee Discipline
Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594, 597–611 (discussing just cause standard and how that standard is
composed); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 955–77
(1984) (defending contract at will on efficiency grounds through law and economic theory); Clyde
W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 65–66 (2000) (presenting comparative approach and pointing out differences
between United States law and that of other countries).
95. Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -915 (2003). For
discussion of Montana’s statute, see generally Marc Jarsulic, Protecting Workers from Wrongful
Discharge: Montana’s Experience with Tort and Statutory Regimes, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 105 (1999).
96. See App. A, infra pp. 1087–1120.
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reasons.97
In response to the perceived harshness of the at-will rule and, in some
instances, in response to judicial unwillingness to provide employees
with a remedy when they refuse to engage in wrongdoing or report
illegal practices, many state legislatures have passed some form of
whistleblowing statute to create a statutory tort regime.98 Currently,
twenty states have enacted whistleblowing statutes with general
application to private employers.99 Of these twenty states, most also
recognize a common law public policy exception to the common law atwill employment rule. Only Florida, Maine, New York, and Rhode
Island do not.100 In addition, the status of the public policy exception in
Arizona since the passage of the Arizona Employee Protection Act is
unclear.101
Of the thirty-one jurisdictions (thirty states plus the District of
Columbia) which do not provide comprehensive statutory protection for
whistleblowers, twenty-six states recognize some form of judicially
created public policy exception.102 However, the extent of the protection
afforded under the public policy exception is often limited and is

97. Id. Federal anti-discrimination laws, which contain a burden-shifting scheme that requires
employers to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for an adverse employment action,
can be seen as an encroachment into the at-will regime, as can provisions specified in employee
handbooks, which, when those provisions are held enforceable, may create additional rights for
employees. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
98. See App. A, infra pp. 1087–1120.
99. Id. I consider the following states to have whistleblower protections of general application to
public and private employees: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. Id. States could be added to or
subtracted from this list, depending on how one defines a “general” whistleblower statute. For
example, the New York statute only applies to private employees if an employee “discloses, or
threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the
employer that is in violation of law, rule or regulation which violation creates and presents a
substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety . . . .” N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a)
(McKinney 2002); see also Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 80, at 107–08 (containing earlier fiftystate survey).
100. See App. A, infra pp. 1087–1120.
101. Id.; see Galati v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 69 P.3d 1011, 1015 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
102. See App. A, infra pp. 1087–1120. Alaska and Delaware recognize a type of retaliatory
discharge action, although they classify it as a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in the employment contract. See Lincoln v. Interior Reg’l Hous. Auth., 30 P.3d 582, 586
(Alaska 2001); Lord v. Souder, 748 A.2d 393, 401 (Del. 2000). The five states that do not recognize
any type of retaliatory discharge are Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas. See App. A,
infra pp. 1087–1120.
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certainly not uniform across these jurisdictions.103 Some states require
that the public policy underlying a retaliatory discharge claim be “wellestablished,”104 “substantial and widely accepted,”105 “well-recognized
and clear,”106 “fundamental and well-defined,”107 or “strong and
compelling.”108 These additional requirements lead to differences among
states.
The fundamental problem in all public policy cases lies in
determining exactly what constitutes a specific, well-established, clear,
and compelling public policy, and courts have taken various approaches
to resolve this question.109 Sources of “public policy” may include only
state statutes,110 state statutes and the state constitution,111 “legislative,
administrative or judicial authority,”112 or the “customs and conventions
of the people” along with state statutes, the constitution, and judicial
decisions.113 Some states broadly categorize the type of conduct
protected by the public policy exception by defining it as reporting any
illegal act.114
Just as the state public policy decisions are uneven, so are the state
whistleblowing statutes. State whistleblowing statutes consist of a
patchwork of provisions.115 While some provide fairly broad
protection,116 others limit protection to a specific industry or area.117 The
103. See App. A, infra pp. 1087–1120.
104. Island v. Buena Vista Resort, 103 S.W.3d 671, 679 (Ark. 2003).
105. Flores v. Am. Pharm. Servs., Inc., 994 P.2d 455, 458 (Colo. 1999).
106. Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 282 (Iowa 2000).
107. Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. 1985).
108. Allum v. Valley Bank of Nev., 970 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Nev. 1998).
109. See App. A, infra pp. 1087–1120.
110. See Island v. Buena Vista Resort, 103 S.W.3d 671, 679 (Ark. 2003).
111. See Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d at 401.
112. Lord v. Souder, 748 A.2d 393, 401 (Del. 2000).
113. Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 588 (Vt. 1986) (quoting Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago &
St. Louis Ry. v. Kinney, 115 N.E. 505, 507 (Ohio 1916)).
114. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Ameristar Casino Vicksburg, Inc., 852 So. 2d 25, 26–27 (Miss. 2003)
(concerning refusal to perform an illegal act and reporting an illegal act).
115. See App. A, infra pp. 1087–1120.
116. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51m (2003) (covering an employee of “a person engaged in
business who has employees” who discloses violations of law); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4113.51–
.53 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003) (covering an employee of any employer with one or more employees
who reports violations of law when “the employee reasonably believes that the violation either is a
criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to
public health or safety or is a felony”).
117. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 3-376 (2002) (covering pesticide control); MO. ANN. STAT.
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state whistleblowing statutes also differ in the type of disclosure they
protect,118 the manner of disclosure they require,119 and the remedies
they provide.120 Judicial interpretation has restricted the scope of some
statutes.121 However, in other instances, it has broadened a statute’s
application.122
Plaintiffs bringing actions for retaliatory discharge in various states
must also meet varying burdens of proof. Depending on the language of
the specific state statute, the whistleblower may have to prove that the
reported wrongdoing actually occurred.123 Other jurisdictions use a less
strict “reasonable belief standard,” requiring the whistleblower to prove
that he or she had a good reason to believe the wrongdoing had occurred
and thus made the report in good faith.124 Several courts have said that
“bad faith” reports should not receive protection.125
§ 197.285 (West 2004) (covering hospital and ambulatory surgical center employees).
118. Compare MO. ANN. STAT. § 197.285 (West 2004) (including reports of facility
mismanagement, fraudulent activity, violations of law relevant to patient care and patient and
facility safety, and “[t]he ability of employees to successfully perform their assigned duties”), with
N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-11.1-04 (1987 & Supp. 2003) (protecting public employees who report job
related violations of law and misuse of public resources).
119. Compare ALA. CODE § 36-26A-3 (2001), and Flood v. Ala. Dep’t of Indust. Relations, 948 F.
Supp. 1535, 1551–53 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (requiring statements made under oath or in form of
affidavit), with GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-5 (2004) (filing a charge, testifying, assisting, or
participating “in any manner in an investigation, action, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter”).
120. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.60.089 (Michie 2002) (filing complaint with commissioner); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 388-10 (2004) (fining and/or imprisoning employer or agent); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 6C-1-4 (Michie 2003) (establishing civil action).
121. See, e.g., McDonald v. Campbell, 821 P.2d 139, 144–45 (Ariz. 1991) (holding that application
of ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 38-531 to 38-534 to employees of the Arizona State Supreme Court is
unconstitutional).
122. See, e.g., Wiggins v. S. Mgmt. Corp., 629 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that a judicial proceeding under Florida’s whistleblower statute also includes an
unemployment compensation hearing).
123. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 2002) (protecting private employee who
“discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy, or practice
of the employer that is in violation of law, rule, or regulation which violation creates and presents a
substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety . . .”); Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 667
N.E.2d 922, 923 (N.Y. 1996) (holding that under section 740, proof of an actual violation is
required).
124. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003) (protecting employee
who reports a violation of law when “the employee reasonably believes that the violation either is a
criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to
public health or safety or is a felony . . .”).
125. Wolcott v. Champion Int’l Corp., 691 F. Supp. 1052, 1065–66 (W.D. Mich. 1987); Johnson v.
Benson, No. 84-2531, 1986 Wisc. App. LEXIS 3113, at *7 (Wisc. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 1986). If the
report was manufactured to implicate another employee or to cover up wrongdoing, then that

1047

CHERRY ZEN

Washington Law Review

Vol. 79:1029, 2004

New York provides perhaps the best example of the shortcomings in
whistleblowing law before the passage of Sarbanes–Oxley. New York’s
whistleblower statute protects only workers who report a problem that
would endanger the health or safety of the public.126 Specifically, the
statute prohibits retaliatory action against an employee who “discloses,
or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity,
policy or practice of the employer that is in violation of law, rule or
regulation which violation creates and presents a substantial and specific
danger to the public health or safety . . . .”127
Even though financial fraud can result in massive layoffs if the
company becomes bankrupt and can lead to individual penury or a
complete loss of retirement savings, New York courts do not view fraud
as a danger to the public welfare within the definition of the
whistleblower statute. For example, in Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Trust
Co. of New York,128 the court held that financial fraud was not a danger
to health and safety.129 Thus, the court did not afford the protection of
the statute to the employee who had reported fraudulent loan
practices.130 Further, in Murphy v. American Home Products Corp.,131
the court declined to create a public policy exception where the plaintiff
had reported “$50 million in illegal account manipulations of secret
pension reserves which improperly inflated the company’s growth in
activity—which I hesitate even to term whistleblowing—should not receive protection. (Perhaps
this is best termed “wolf whistling,” after the story of the boy who falsely cried wolf). On the other
hand, there may be instances in which the employee making the report has a “malicious” motive,
such as implicating another employee out of spite, but the report is accurate. In that case, it would
seem that the whistleblower’s motive should be irrelevant. There are also instances in which it
seems that a whistleblower is mistaken, even though the whistleblower’s motives are pure. Courts
are divided on whether the whistleblower’s state of mind should matter in determining whether that
whistleblower states a valid claim. Compare Wolcott, 691 F. Supp. at 1065–66 (holding that the
Michigan Whistleblowers Protection Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.361–.369 (West 1994),
did not protect plaintiff who knowingly participated in employer’s illegal activity and “who reported
his employer for violating laws in retribution for the employer’s failure to meet his demands”), with
Phinney v. Verbrugge, 564 N.W.2d 532, 555 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (“[W]hether plaintiff sought
personal gain in making her reports, rather than the public good, is legally irrelevant . . . .”). Of
course, the state of mind probably would matter in how that whistleblower came across to the
jury—those whistleblowers who do have a malicious motive probably would have more difficulty in
terms of amount of recovery.
126. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 2002).
127. Id.
128. 548 N.Y.S.2d 513 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
129. Id. at 520.
130. Id. at 516–18.
131. 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
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income and allowed high-ranking officers to reap unwarranted bonuses
from a management incentive plan . . . .”132
Although fraud is not a “danger” in the traditional sense of safety
problems with a nuclear reactor or toxic chemicals discharged onto
farmland, white collar crimes such as fraud may create serious economic
damage. For example, many Enron employees who invested heavily in
Enron stock have lost their savings for retirement.133 Although it is
perhaps not an immediate “danger,” employees who witness fraud
should have some ability to stop the criminal activity without worrying
about being fired.134
As the forgoing section has shown, state whistleblower law is murky,
piecemeal, disorganized, and varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The
stories of Watkins and Cooper demonstrate the differences between
various state approaches and the vagaries and inconsistencies of those
approaches.
2.

Federal Whistleblower Statutes

The pre-Sarbanes–Oxley federal approach to whistleblower protection
is similarly piecemeal. If a private-sector employee reports a violation of
a federal statute, either internally or to a law enforcement agency, that
employee may receive protection.135 Whether the whistleblower receives
any legal protection depends on whether the federal statute violated by
the employer contains an anti-retaliation provision.136 Conceptually, the
whistleblower provisions that accompany each statute can be seen as a
way of strengthening the enforcement of that statute.
One beneficial component of federal whistleblower protection is that
government employees are generally covered by civil service

132. Id. at 87, 89.
133. See Ellen E. Schultz, Enron Employees to Settle Retirement Suit for $85 Million, WALL ST. J.,
May 13, 2004, at A2 (describing settlement as ten cents for every dollar lost).
134. Although Sarbanes–Oxley now covers reports of fraud, the Act’s civil provisions only apply to
publicly traded companies. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806(a), 116 Stat.
745, 802–04 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2003)). Therefore, an
employee who reports fraud in New York may or may not have a civil claim, depending wholly on
whether the employee works at a privately held company, a non-profit, or a publicly traded
company. Although the public company requirement by necessity would probably encompass some
of the state’s larger employers, the law still leaves a major gap.
135. See App. B, infra pp. 1121–23.
136. Id.
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protections.137 For example, in the recent scandal over the abuse of Iraqi
prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison, it was a whistleblower, Joseph Darby,
who brought the problems to light.138 By slipping photographs of the
abuse under a superior’s door, Darby brought necessary attention to the
problem.139 His actions prompted an investigation, popular outcry, and
ongoing court-martials of those involved.140 As a member of the military
reporting torture and sexual abuse, Darby would be protected by a
federal statute that specifically addresses such matters.141 Indeed, his
conduct has earned him the respect of senior military officials.142
However, Darby’s family remains concerned about possible impacts on
his career and personal life,143 as well as reaction from the soldiers who
have been accused of the abuses.144 Despite these difficulties,
government employees are generally much more well-protected than
private employees.145
Although Appendix B catalogues the federal statutes that include
whistleblower protections,146 many others contain no such protection for
whistleblowers. For example, if a private sector employee, such as a
private contractor at a nuclear power plant, reports a violation of nuclear
safety regulations, that individual would be covered by federal law
because the regulations include an anti-retaliation provision.147 If, on the
other hand, the statute is not one of those listed in Appendix II, it does
not contain an anti-retaliation provision, and the job of a whistleblower
137. Id. (listing statutes applicable to federal government employment).
138. Elizabeth Williamson, One Soldier’s Unlikely Act: Family Fears for Man Who Reported Iraqi
Prisoner Abuse, WASH. POST, May 6, 2004, at A16.
139. Id.
140. See Gregg Zoroya, Whistleblower Asked Mom’s Advice: She Knew He Was Bothered Before
Abuse Scandal Broke, USA TODAY, May 12, 2004, at A4.
141. See 10 U.S.C. § 1034(b) (2000) (prohibiting retaliatory personnel actions against military
personnel who report instances of sexual harassment).
142. See Zoroya, supra note 140, at A4 (describing Defense Secretary’s comments that
whistleblower was “honorable and responsible”).
143. There have already been some ramifications for Darby’s personal life. In response to the
publicity, an alleged paramour has come forward to talk with the press. Matthew Sweeney, Hero a
Two-Timing Rat—Whistleblower’s Double-Life Stuns Gal, N.Y. POST, May 11, 2004, at 8.
144. Williamson, supra note 138, at A17.
145. Qui tam actions are brought on behalf of the government, and plaintiffs who report fraud
actions that have occurred are given financial rewards for having brought the action. For a useful
theoretical discussion of many private rights of action, including those for securities fraud and qui
tam actions, see generally Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002).
146. See App. B, infra pp. 1121–23.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a) (2000).
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reporting a violation of that statute to enforcement officials is not
necessarily secure. For example, Title IX, which promotes equality in
women’s and men’s educational opportunities, does not contain an antiretaliation provision.148 Recently, a basketball coach alleged that after he
reported unequal treatment for female athletes, he was fired.149 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the
claim, and the U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari.150
In effect, the federal statutory scheme results in a haphazard
enforcement structure. Whistleblower advocates continue to lobby
Congress to pass a statute that provides a general federal cause of action
for private-sector employees who are fired after blowing the whistle on a
violation of federal law.151 Such a blanket anti-retaliation provision
would make whistleblower protection the default rule for federal
legislation.
3.

Sociological Approaches to Whistleblowing

From this view of whistleblowing and employment law before the
passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley, this Article briefly turns to a discussion
of the sociology and psychology surrounding whistleblowers. It is
important to understand that not only has the law been generally
unsympathetic to whistleblowers, but so have co-workers and others
outside the organization who do not support a decision to report
wrongdoing.152 Watkins has said whistleblowing at Enron was “not an
easy road to take” partly because the company planned to “just stick
[her] in a corner and treat [her] like a pariah and sort of force [her] out.
They just imploded too fast to have that plan work.”153 In light of this
148. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2000).
149. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2002) (rejecting coach’s
claim), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 2834 (June 14, 2004) (No. 02-1672).
150. Id.
151. One such advocacy group, the National Whistleblower Center, suggests just such a broad
federal protection for whistleblowers on its website, which includes the text of a model act. See The
National
Whistleblower
Protection
Act,
at
http://www.whistleblowers.org/html/
model_whistleblower_law.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2004). It is worth noting that such a model act
would also be beneficial on a state level, given that the same issues of piecemeal coverage arise on
the state level as well.
152. For an example of colleagues who did not support a whistleblower, see the case of Grace
Pierce, a doctor on a research team who raised concerns about the use of saccharine in drugs for
children. Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 507 (N.J. 1980); see MYRON PERETZ
GLAZER & PENINA MIGDAL GLAZER, THE WHISTLEBLOWERS 93–95 (1989).
153. Liz Fedor, Enron’s Watkins Relishes New Role, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Feb. 3, 2003, at D3.
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extreme societal disapproval,154 any law that hopes to be effective in
promoting whistleblowing must be a strong one.
One paradigm regarding whistleblowers casts the reporting employee
as a type of scoundrel and inevitably focuses on the employee’s
disloyalty to the organization. In this archetype, the whistleblower is a
disgruntled employee with an axe to grind with his or her former
employer. The whistleblower may well have been fired for
incompetence, or let go in a layoff. In either event, the whistleblower
feels the need to “get back” at his or her former employer, by
implicating a co-worker or supervisor against whom he or she held a
grudge.155
On the other hand, whistleblowers are also portrayed as lone voices of
reason, morality, and truth who speak out to protect the public from
harm. This paradigm usually pits the conscience of one individual
against the power and resources of a large organization. One need only
watch the movies Silkwood156 or The Insider157 to see the myth of the
heroic whistleblower writ large. In part, the myth of the heroic
whistleblower represents American individualism. The individual
worker, refusing to give up his or her morals and identity, instead stands
up for what he or she believes is right in the face of overwhelming
power and pressure to conform.158

154. See Sherron Watkins, Address at Samford University (Feb. 19, 2004).
155. See Jones v. Enterprise Rent A Car, 187 F. Supp. 2d 670, 673 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (detailing
plaintiff’s allegations that she was forced to perform various types of consumer fraud in order to
keep her job, but later became the target of company investigation). A high profile example of
whistleblower-as-wrongdoer was the case of Mark Whitacre, an executive at Archer Daniels
Midland Co. who blew the whistle on anti-trust violations at the company. See generally KURT
EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT: A TRUE STORY (2001). Whitacre was later found to have
embezzled over $9 million. Id.
156. The movie was based on the life of Karen Silkwood, a chemical technician at the Kerr-McGee
Corp. nuclear power plant who reported problems with plant safety. SILKWOOD (MGM Home
Entm’t 1983). Silkwood had been exposed to plutonium and died in 1973 in a single car accident
that some viewed with suspicion. Id.; see also The Karen Silkwood Story, LOS ALAMOS SCI., Vol.
XXIII (Nov. 23, 1995), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
reaction/interact/silkwood.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2004).
157. The movie deals with a former scientist at Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. who violated
contractual agreements to expose the company’s decision to include addictive ingredients in
cigarettes. THE INSIDER (Touchstone Pictures 1999). For an in-depth discussion of the case that
became the basis for the movie, see generally Brian Stryker Weinstein, In Defense of Jeffrey
Wigand: A First Amendment Challenge to the Enforcement of Employee Confidentiality Agreements
Against Whistleblowers, 49 S.C. L. Rev. 129 (1997).
158. C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN LIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL POWER 14–15
(2001).
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The scholarship on whistleblowers reveals quite a different story from
either the “hero” or “dark side” scenarios—one in which whistleblowers
are isolated by co-workers, relegated to dead-end positions, and affected
in their personal lives by “spillover” from workplace stress associated
with whistleblowing.159 According to a study of eighty-four
whistleblowers conducted in the early 1990s, “82% experienced
harassment after blowing the whistle, 60% were fired, 17% lost their
homes, and 10% admitted to attempted suicide.”160 Due to the extreme
stress, many whistleblowers develop serious mental illness, such as
depression, which can lead to other problems, such as alcohol or drug
abuse.161 The harsh truth about whistleblowing and the high price that
whistleblowers pay is depicted in literature as well, most notably in
Henrik Ibsen’s perceptive drama, An Enemy of the People.162
In Bowen v. Parking Authority of the City of Camden,163 the
whistleblowers confronted just such pressures.164 The two plaintiffs
reported alleged corruption within the department, including the use of
city property for personal gain, the distribution of materials that could be
sexually harassing, and the inappropriate award of contracts based on the
bidder’s personal “connections” and willingness to participate in a
kickback scheme.165 While the two plaintiff-whistleblowers were in the
process of cooperating with authorities and building a case, the stress
mounted.166 At one point, one of the whistleblowers wrote a letter to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) stating:
Over the last two years I have made diligent efforts to report and
resolve numerous flagrant acts of discrimination/sexual
harassment at our facilities . . . . At the present time I am
functioning under intense pressure and threatened with
termination . . . . Besides living in fear of losing my job I am
159. Culp, supra note 4, at 113.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See generally HENRIK IBSEN, An Enemy of the People, in THREE PLAYS OF HENRIK IBSEN
(Elenor Marx-Aveling & William Archer trans., Heritage Press 1965) (1882). In the drama, the
protagonist is confronted with a terrible choice: blow the whistle on the polluted water in his town
and be fired from his job, evicted from his lodgings, and socially shunned, or keep silent, knowing
all the while as a medical doctor that the sick and invalid who come to use the bath ostensibly for a
cure are being made ill. Id.
163. No. CIV.00-5765 (JBS), 2003 WL 22145814 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2003).
164. Id. at *6.
165. Id. at **1–6.
166. Id. at *6.
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also concerned for my personal safety as well as the safety of
my co-workers . . . .167
The second whistleblower also suffered from stress, anxiety, and
depression.168 After being constructively discharged, the first
whistleblower received a letter charging him with retaliation and
harassment, apparently for making the reports.169 Tragically, the parking
authority’s executive director, who had been deeply involved in the
fraud and kickback schemes, shot and wounded the first whistleblower
before turning the weapon on himself.170
Despite negative reaction from supervisors and co-workers, it is often
forgotten that the whistleblower is generally not being disloyal to the
“true” goals of the organization. The organization’s stated goals do not
(indeed, under corporate law principles, they cannot) involve illegal
activity or fraud.171 Thus, although perhaps disloyal to management or
an immediate supervisor who is performing illegal acts, whistleblowers
are true to the stated ideals of their organization. For example, many
WorldCom employees blamed Cynthia Cooper for her discovery and
reporting of the WorldCom fraud, but they failed to realize that Cooper
actually prevented further harm to the company and its employees by
doing her job correctly.172 If the books can be corrected and the
wrongdoers ousted from the organization, then the company may avoid
further criminal sanctions and has a better chance to recover from the
fraud.
Ultimately, employees receive little encouragement to blow the
whistle. State and federal laws are inconsistent in their coverage,
application, and enforcement.173 Additionally, the negative views of
whistleblowing further discourage employees from reporting
wrongdoing. With this sociological view in mind, this Article turns to an
examination of the most salient provisions of Sarbanes–Oxley, which
affect both securities law and employment law.

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at *8.
170. Id. at *14.
171. A corporation is empowered to act only to the extent that its business is lawful. Otherwise, the
corporation is acting ultra vires. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 16.1, at 676 (1986)
(citing MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01 (1979)).
172. Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 2, at 33.
173. See App. A, infra pp. 1087–1120; App. B, infra pp. 1121–23.
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II.

SARBANES–OXLEY ACT CHANGES TO SECURITIES LAW
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

Depending on one’s view, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act either completely
revised the field of securities regulation or merely made superficial
changes to the status quo.174 Passing the Act in response to the corporate
scandals that erupted at Enron,175 WorldCom,176 Global Crossing,177
Adelphia,178 and Tyco,179 Congress aimed to reduce accounting fraud,
police insider transactions, and ensure the integrity of analyst
research.180 In short, the purpose of the legislation is to increase
transparency in financial markets, which allows investors to rely on the
accuracy of financial information. As one commentator observed, “the
primary policy of the federal securities laws involves the remediation of
information asymmetries, that is, equalization of the information
available to outside investors and insiders.”181 Fundamentally, securities
law places a priority on disclosure because securities themselves do not
have fixed or inherent value.182
Whether Sarbanes–Oxley actually advances these central goals of
securities regulation is a matter of some debate. Obviously, the law will
174. As Joseph Grundfest, an SEC commissioner from 1985 to 1990, observed in a symposium on
the collapse of Enron:
We are still too close to the Enron and WorldCom frauds, I believe, to draw any firm
conclusion regarding the wisdom of the Congressional response as reflected in . . . Sarbanes–
Oxley . . . . Some observers will complain that Sarbanes–Oxley has gone too far while others
will protest that it has not gone far enough.
Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of United States Securities Regulation,
8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 2 (2002).
175. See supra Part I.A.1.
176. See supra Part I.A.2.
177. See Almar Latour & Dennis K. Berman, Global Crossing, SEC Deal Expected, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 22, 2004, at A8 (describing accounting fraud at Global Crossing and subsequent settlement
with shareholders and the SEC).
178. See Susan Pulliam & Robert Frank, Inside Adelphia: A Long Battle over Disclosing Stock
Options, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2004, at A1 (describing $2 billion in loans made to the Rigas family,
who controlled the cable company, and the inflation of financial statements in order to conceal those
loans).
179. See infra notes 220–221 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 8.
181. Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law After Enron, 80
WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 450 (2002). That is not to say that quantity of disclosure guarantees quality of
disclosure. One commentator has cited Great Britain’s “true and fair” principle as a way to prevent
the “use of technicalities to evade proper disclosures.” Alan Kohler, System of Governance Shown
to Be Bordering on the Useless, AUSTL. FIN. REV., June 29, 2002, at 72.
182. Seligman, supra note 181, at 450.
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be perceived differently by corporate lawyers who prepare the periodic
filings required by the SEC, plaintiff’s securities litigators, and securities
defense attorneys. In part, the success of the law will depend on the
SEC’s willingness and ability (through a proposed and much-needed
increase in resources)183 to enforce the new laws. The Act’s success will
also depend on the extent to which it is resisted and co-opted by industry
and professional groups with major financial interests in the securities
markets, such as auditors, corporate attorneys, investment bankers, and
research analysts. Another possible barrier to the Act’s success is that
corporate boards themselves are composed of rather insular groups—
members have similar sets of connections and are often prone to
groupthink. Will these groups actually listen to the employees who are
blowing the whistle?184
A.

General Provisions

One of the major purposes of Sarbanes–Oxley is to promote the flow
of accurate information to investors so that they can make informed
decisions about how to allocate their resources.185 The whistleblowing
provisions advance this purpose in that, if effective, they will reduce the
amount of fraudulent financial information. The following section is a
brief summary of the problems that gave rise to the Act’s provisions. In
addition, it describes the measures that the Act and the regulations under
the Act take to correct these problems, and also describes events
subsequent to the passage of the Act.186

183. Yochi J. Dreazen & Deborah Solomon, Shifting the Cost of Regulation: To Shore Up Budgets,
Agencies May Tap Industry ‘User Fees’, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2003, at A4.
184. In a way, the perspective of the whistleblower, who is guarding the underlying ideals of the
organization, would be an ideal addition to a corporate board. How one would go about obtaining
such a perspective, however, given the current system of corporate governance, is a difficult
question.
185. H.R. Res. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted) (stating that purpose of Sarbanes–Oxley Act of
2002 is “To protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures
made pursuant to the securities laws . . .”).
186. Other summaries of Sarbanes–Oxley written for practitioners are readily available at many
websites of law firms that assist corporate clients with securities compliance. See generally HAROLD
S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES–OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE (2003) (describing provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act for practitioners); Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127 (2002) (same).
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1.

Research Analysts and Conflicts of Interest

Section 501 of the Act attempts to lessen conflicts of interest among
research analysts.187 There has been considerable concern that research
analysts working for investment banks were assigning positive “buy”
ratings to the stock of corporations that used their employer’s investment
banking services.188 Sometimes research analysts were given bonuses
based on the amount of business the investment banking divisions
received.189 As the analysts were ostensibly “independent,” this hidden
conflict of interest tainted much of the research that had been released to
the public.190 An investor could receive biased information without any
indication that the source had an ulterior motive—that is, touting stocks
underwritten by an affiliated investment bank.191
The Act attempts to remedy these conflicts in two ways. First, the Act
attempts to prevent investment banks from exercising control over
research analysts.192 Section 501 prohibits investment banks from preapproving research reports, supervising analysts, or compensating
analysts in any way tied to their underwriting.193 Further, the investment
banks may not retaliate against analysts for producing a report that is
187. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 501, 116 Stat. 745, 791–93 (codified at
15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-6 (West Supp. 2003)).
188. Two notorious examples illustrate the extent of the problem. At the height of the internet
bubble, analysts from Merrill Lynch publicly encouraged investors to buy specific Internet stocks;
at the same time, the research analysts were sending internal e-mail messages to each other trashing
the same stocks. Charles Gasparino, Merrill Lynch Will Negotiate with Spitzer, WALL ST. J., Apr.
15, 2002, at C1; Jerry Markon, Merrill Plaintiffs Seek to Append Spitzer Charges, WALL ST. J., Apr.
16, 2002, at C7. These e-mails made it obvious that the research analysts were highly skeptical of
stocks in these Internet companies that had no sound model for generating revenue. However,
because Merrill was the investment bank that had underwritten the stocks, and was therefore
promoting them, the analysts doctored their research and reversed their conclusions for presentation
to the public. See Gasparino, supra, at C1; see also Affidavit in Support of Application for an Order
Pursuant to General Business Law Section 354, at 10–11, 13, In re Spitzer, No. 02-4015-22 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 8, 2002) (containing excerpts from Merrill Lynch employee e-mails), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2004).
The second example is that of Jack Grubman, a prominent research analyst with Salomon Smith
Barney, who allegedly granted favorable ratings to WorldCom in return for investment banking
business for his firm (as well as his children’s admittance to certain elite pre-schools in New York
City). Charles Gasparino, Ghosts of E-Mails Continue to Haunt Wall Street: In Grubman Inquiry,
Preschool Is Pressed on Twins’ Admission, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2002, at C1.
189. See supra note 188.
190. See supra note 188.
191. See supra note 188.
192. Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 501.
193. Id.
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neutral or negative.194
The second way the Act seeks to prevent conflicts is through a regime
of disclosure.195 Research reports must disclose whether that issuer is a
client of the associated investment bank.196 In addition, analysts must
disclose their own personal holdings in the issuer.197 Further, research
reports must disclose the business the investment bank conducted with
that company.198 Sarbanes–Oxley also requires investment banks to
provide standardized criteria for giving a company a buy, sell, or hold
rating.199 Finally, the Act prohibits a company from awarding bonuses to
analysts based on the company’s level of investment banking
business.200
Since Congress passed the Act, there have been further developments
to address conflicts of interest. On April 29, 2003, ten major investment
banks announced that they would pay $1.4 billion into a fund to settle
lawsuits accusing them of intentionally biasing their research.201 Of the
total settlement, the parties agreed to place $432.5 million into a fund
that would distribute research to investors independent of any brokerage
firm.202 Additionally, many investors have brought securities arbitration
actions on the basis of tainted research reports.203
2.

Increased Criminal Penalties for Securities Fraud

The Act augments existing white collar criminal statutes by creating
two new criminal offenses, amending existing criminal statutes, and
increasing the penalties for existing federal crimes, either by directly
amending the statute or by requiring rulemaking to change the

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Walter Hamilton & Thomas S. Mulligan, Wall Street Will Pay $1.4 Billion: Regulators Detail
Final Terms of a Settlement with Brokerage Firms over Analyst Conflicts, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29,
2003, at A1.
202. Id.; see also SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., No. 03.CIV.2937 (WHP), 2003 WL 21517973, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2003) (describing settlement of cases and discussing continuing issues after the
settlement).
203. See, e.g., Susanne Craig & Ruth Simon, Morgan Stanley Is Ordered to Pay Client $100,000,
WALL ST. J., June 13, 2003, at C7 (describing one such case).
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sentencing guidelines for those federal offenses.204 Two commentators
have recently suggested that this approach adds little to the current
federal laws regarding securities fraud.205 Another commentator,
however, is more optimistic about the new criminal protections, stating
that “the Act’s criminal provisions make significant strides toward
piercing the veil of corporate silence.”206
3.

Standardization of Accounting Practices

Additionally, Sarbanes–Oxley attempts to standardize certain
accounting practices. In part, this standardization is accomplished by the
creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB),
an entity that regulates the private audit firms that currently monitor
public company accounting.207 The PCAOB sets certain quality control,
independence, and other ethics standards for outside auditors.208 Of
course, as noted by one commentator,
[w]hether this body achieves anything useful will depend
substantially on who is appointed. Judging by the work of
comparable bodies attempting to oversee the accounting and
auditing professions in past decades, this will not be an easy job
to do well. Enormous lobbying pressure from those industries
can be expected to dampen any major initiatives.209
Indeed, as predicted, the Board became mired in controversy when

204. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 901–904, 116 Stat. 745, 804–05
(codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341, 1343, 1349 (West Supp. 2003); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1131 (West Supp.
2003)). There are further signs that penalties for white collar crime may increase, as an advisory
group to the Federal Sentencing Commission has recommended that directors be held accountable
for compliance programs at their companies. Gary Fields, Strict Corporate-Crime Sentencing
Sought, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2003, at C1.
205. Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects
of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 698 (2002) (“[Congress] trumpeted
[Sarbanes–Oxley’s] new crimes and new enhanced penalties as providing significant deterrence for
securities fraud. In reality, these provisions are unlikely to have much real impact on deterrence.
They criminalize little additional conduct and do little to enhance real penalties.”); Recent
Legislation, Corporate Law—Congress Passes Corporate and Accounting Fraud Legislation, 116
HARV. L. REV. 728, 734 (2002) (arguing that only tangible effect will be number of charges a
prosecutor can bring, perhaps inducing more guilty pleas).
206. Brickey, supra note 42, at 359.
207. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 101–109, 116 Stat. 745, 750–71
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7211–7219 (West Supp. 2003)).
208. Id.
209. Cunningham, supra note 18, at 944.
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the SEC named William Webster as its chair.210 Although Webster had
held numerous government positions, including that of CIA director,
Webster had no connection or particular expertise with accounting and,
in fact, had been a director of U.S. Technologies, a failed Internet firm
that had been sued by shareholders for securities fraud.211 Ultimately,
Webster resigned from the PCAOB before it held its first meeting.212
Critics of the Bush administration pointed to Webster’s lack of
accounting expertise as evidence that the administration was far from
serious about corporate governance reform.213
4.

Corporate Governance

In one of its more publicized provisions, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act
mandates that chief executive officers and chief financial officers of
publicly traded companies review, sign, and take responsibility for the
periodic reports the companies file with the SEC.214 However, this is not
in any real sense a departure from previous law. Company executives
were already supposed to ensure that the corporation made no material
misstatements in the periodic filings,215 and shareholders could sue
executives for either nondisclosure or false disclosure of facts in the
filings.216 As one commentator put it, “investors believed that the
certification requirement was a meaningless exercise for those intent on
committing financial fraud.”217 On the other hand, such a certification
requirement would make it easier for prosecutors to prove the requisite
state of mind needed to obtain a criminal conviction.
Sarbanes–Oxley has other implications for corporate governance. One

210. John R. Wilke, Webster Says He Will Likely Quit as Head of New Accounting Board, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 12, 2002, at A1.
211. Id.
212. Michael Schroeder, Webster Makes it Official and Quits Accounting Board, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 13, 2002, at A3.
213. See Wilke, supra note 210, at A1.
214. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777–78 (codified at
15 U.S.C.A. § 7241 (West Supp. 2003)).
215. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).
216. See id.
217. Aronson, supra note 186, at 143. Another commentator succinctly summarized the
ambivalence about these rules as follows: “These provisions look to prevent CEOs and CFOs from
hiding behind the defense of ignorance . . . . The rules may be sensible, but few knowledgeable
people really believed those senior executives, and none but the most sympathetic or gullible
absolved them from responsibility.” Cunningham, supra note 18, at 955–56.
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major change is that the Act forbids loans to insiders.218 Before, insiders
co-mingled personal funds with corporate funds, and many corporations
gave insiders loans on extremely favorable terms.219 Recent controversy
about such co-mingling of funds has focused on L. Dennis Kozlowski,
the former head of Tyco, Inc., who threw a lavish (indeed, decadent)
party in Italy for his wife’s birthday, which prosecutors assert was
charged to the company as part of a supposed board meeting that was
also taking place in Italy.220 In addition, the allegation that Kozlowski
used Tyco’s assets to pay for a $6,000 shower curtain in a bathroom
used only by the family’s maid has led Kozlowski to become not only
the subject of many tasteless jokes, but also, more seriously, the subject
of criminal prosecution.221
The Act also contains items that have long been considered “best
practices” for publicly-traded companies and are not novel in any way
except that they are now mandatory. For example, issuers are required to
disclose insider trades in a more timely fashion,222 as well as to disclose
other developments that could have an effect on the value of the
company’s stock price.223 The Act also strongly suggests that a
“financial expert” be a member of the issuer’s audit committee.224
Finally, the Act requires management to file a report with the SEC
detailing its internal controls to ensure that fraud does not go
unnoticed.225
The Act also seeks to remedy the problem of auditor conflicts by
prohibiting auditors from providing other services to their audit
clients.226 During the 1990s, one of the most lucrative sources of revenue
218. Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 402 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (West Supp. 2003)).
219. Another scandal about insider loans and payments that has recently come to light took place
within Hollinger International. See Mark Heinzel, Hollinger Report Says Black Hid Fees in
Barbados, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2004, at A3; Mark Heinzel & Christopher J. Chipello, Report Slams
Hollinger’s Black for a ‘Corporate Kleptocracy,’ WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2004, at A1.
220. Mark Maremont, Finally a CEO Faces a Jury: Kozlowski, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2003, at C1
(describing party for Linda Kozlowski’s birthday).
221. Colleen DeBaise & Mark Maremont, Jurors Examine Costs of Décor Chez Kozlowski, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 16, 2003, at B1; Colleen DeBaise, Newest ‘Tyco Gone Wild’ Video Is Out, and Jurors
See $6,000 Shower Curtain, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2003, at C1 (describing, in addition to shower
curtain, the outrageous prices of other home furnishings, including a mirror valued at $103,000 and
a Persian rug valued at $191,250, which were allegedly furnished at Tyco shareholders’ expense).
222. Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 403 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p (West Supp. 2003)).
223. Id. § 409 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (West Supp. 2003)).
224. Id. § 407 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7265 (West. Supp. 2003)).
225. Id. § 404 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262 (West Supp. 2003)).
226. Id. § 201 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (West Supp. 2003)).
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for accounting firms was selling not only audit services, but also other
consulting and legal services to their auditing clients.227 The crossselling of services, however, led to the very real threat of entanglement
and conflicts of interest because an accounting firm’s auditing branch
would be hesitant to criticize the consulting work that another branch of
the same firm had performed.228 It was this type of interlock that led to
the indictment and subsequent failure of accounting firm Arthur
Andersen in connection with its role as consultant and auditor for Waste
Management, Global Crossing, and Enron.229 Additionally, the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act contains document destruction provisions, which
make it a federal offense to destroy documents of the type that Arthur
Andersen destroyed when it was under investigation.230
5.

Securities Fraud Litigation

Only a few years before the accounting scandals, Congress took
action to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring securities class
action lawsuits.231 The enforcement of our securities laws, like the
enforcement of many regulatory schemes, is partly the responsibility of
government agencies—in the case of securities regulation, the SEC—
and is in part left to plaintiffs who take on the role of private attorneys
general.232 In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation and
Reform Act (PSLRA) with the express purpose of limiting actions for
securities fraud.233 The PSLRA “threw numerous substantive and
procedural roadblocks” in front of plaintiffs seeking to bring securities
fraud actions.234 Among other numerous requirements, it raised the
227. See BARBARA LEY TOFFLER & JENNIFER REINGOLD, FINAL ACCOUNTING 49–51 (2003). One
former Arthur Andersen partner has described the process of gaining additional revenue from
consulting as “turning a blind eye to accounting standards in order to earn the goodwill and trust of
the client, and squeezing the consultants into meetings as often as possible in hopes of getting more
overall business.” Id. at 49.
228. See id. at 50–51.
229. See State Officials Revoke Andersen’s License, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 21, 2002, at E2
(describing Arthur Andersen’s conviction for obstructing justice in the Enron probe and subsequent
revocation of license to practice in Connecticut).
230. Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 802 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1519 (West Supp. 2003)). In response to
this change in the law, companies should implement a standard document retention policy. Id.
231. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101(b), 109 Stat.
737, 743–49 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000)).
232. See Bucy, supra note 145, at 31–54.
233. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 101(b).
234. Michael G. Lange & Michael T. Matraia, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002: Political Sound
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pleading standard: in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must allege facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendants
acted with scienter.235 Plaintiffs had to allege such facts without the
benefit of discovery, which the PSLRA stayed until the complaint had
survived a motion to dismiss.236
The Sarbanes–Oxley changes to securities fraud litigation only
marginally ease the burden on plaintiffs or mitigate the effects of the
PSLRA. For actions that were commenced after July 30, 2002, § 804
extends the statute of limitations from one to two years after discovery
of the fraud and from three to five years after the fraud occurred.237
Further, § 803 makes it easier for plaintiffs’ attorneys to collect
restitution for securities fraud from the personal assets of corrupt
executives.238 The Act does this by amending the bankruptcy code to
prevent the discharge in bankruptcy of debts related to securities
fraud.239 Finally, § 306 gives private litigants the right to bring a
derivative lawsuit to recover profits that executives earn through insider
trades made during pension fund blackout periods (i.e., if pension funds
are frozen out and cannot trade in the stock, executives should not be
allowed to trade in the stock at that time either).240
B.

Whistleblowing Provisions

In addition to the changes described above, Sarbanes–Oxley attempts
to respond directly to the plight of employees who blow the whistle on
corporate fraud. The following section details the changes that
Sarbanes–Oxley makes to securities law and employment law. In
particular, Sarbanes–Oxley provides federal statutory protection to
whistleblowers who report fraud at publicly traded companies,241
Bites Posing as Reform, 12 A.B.A. SEC. NEWS 2, 2 (Winter 2003).
235. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
236. Id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). One consequence of the PSLRA is that pension funds and other
institutional investors must take a leading role in prosecuting securities class action litigations.
Arden Dale, Pensions Join Class-Action Suits at Faster Pace, Lending Clout, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14,
2004, available at 2004 WL-WSJ 56917066.
237. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 804, 116 Stat. 745, 801 (codified at 28
U.S.C.A. § 1658 (West Supp. 2003)).
238. See id. § 803 (codified at 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a) (West Supp. 2003)).
239. Id.
240. Id. § 306 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7244 (West Supp. 2003); 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021, 1132
(West Supp. 2003)).
241. Id. § 806(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West Supp. 2003)).
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provides criminal penalties for retaliation against whistleblowers,242 and
requires publicly traded companies to institute procedures for handling
internal complaints.243
1.

Section 806: Federalizing the Law of Whistleblowing

Under § 806 of Sarbanes–Oxley, whistleblowers who report instances
of fraud internally or to governmental agencies are statutorily protected
from retaliation if they work at publicly traded companies.244 Sarbanes–
Oxley therefore changes the landscape of whistleblower law by
federalizing a portion of the law that had been composed of a patchwork
of federal statutes, state statutes, and common law exceptions to the atwill employment rule.245 Had it been in force before the scandals broke,
§ 806 would have been directly applicable to both Watkins’s and
Cooper’s employment situations.
Section 806 expressly forbids a publicly traded company or “any
officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company”
from discharging, demoting, suspending, threatening, harassing, or
otherwise discriminating against an employee who engages in certain
forms of protected whistleblowing activity.246 The Act defines protected
activity in one of two ways. First, employees are protected when they
“provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise
assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee
reasonably believes constitutes a violation of . . . any provision of
Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders . . . .”247 This type of
activity is protected, however, only if the “information or assistance” is
provided in an appropriate forum: to a “Federal regulatory or law
enforcement agency,” to a “[m]ember of Congress or any committee of
Congress,” or to “a person with supervisory authority over the employee
(or such other person working for the employer who has the authority to
investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct) . . . .”248 Alternatively,
the Act protects employees when they:
file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise assist
242. Id. § 1107 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513 (West Supp. 2003)).
243. Id. § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West Supp. 2003)).
244. Id. § 806(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West Supp. 2003)).
245. See App. A, infra pp. 1087–1120.
246. Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 806(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West Supp. 2003)).
247. Id.
248. Id.

1064

CHERRY ZEN

Employee Whistleblowing After Sarbanes–Oxley
in a proceeding filed or about to be filed (with any knowledge of
the employer) relating to an alleged violation of . . . any rule or
regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any
provision of Federal law relating to fraud against
shareholders.249
In other words, the Act protects whistleblowers who make internal
reports of violations, as long as those reports are made to a supervisor or
another individual within the organization.250 Moreover, the supervisor
must have enough institutional power to investigate the wrongdoing.251
The Act, therefore, does not protect an employee who confers with a
peer, or discusses an accounting impropriety with a subordinate
internally.
Externally, the law covers reports to government agencies, such as the
SEC.252 It also protects employees who provide information that would
assist a shareholder lawsuit for a securities fraud violation.253 Reporting
a violation to the media, however, would not be protected. One would
assume that, although a report to the media would effectively expose the
relevant concern, such a report could result in an extreme amount of
adverse publicity.254 One could view this as striking an economic
balance between encouraging reports of wrongdoing and, at the same
time, preventing mistaken, erroneous, or malicious reports from reaching
the press, where substantial harm to a company’s reputation—not to
mention stock price—would result.255
The whistleblower’s required state of mind is described by the statute,
but this standard will likely be interpreted by courts. The issue is
whether the whistleblower’s motives must be pure or whether the
whistleblower is still protected if he or she intended to implicate a coworker or cover up his or her own wrongdoing. What if the complaints
of fraud are completely false or without any basis in fact? Section 806 of
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act establishes that, in order to obtain the protection

249. Id.
250. See id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. For a discussion of the issues surrounding whistleblowing to the media, see generally Elletta
Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Who Blows the Whistle to the Media and Why:
Organizational Characteristics of Media Whistleblowers, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 151 (1994).
255. The media lacks any formal institutional power to address the problem, unlike Congress, a
regulatory agency, or a supervisor within organization.
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of the statute, a whistleblower must have a “reasonable belief” that there
has been a violation of the federal securities laws.256 If the state cases are
any indication, this statutory language will likely become a subject for
litigation.257
If an employer violates § 806, the employee is entitled to “all relief
necessary to make the employee whole.”258 This “make whole” relief
includes “reinstatement with the same seniority status that the employee
would have had, but for the discrimination,” “back pay, with interest,”
and litigation costs, including attorney’s fees.259 There is, however, no
provision for punitive damages.260
The procedure for commencing a whistleblowing action is only
briefly described in the Act.261 Instead, Sarbanes–Oxley adopts the
procedures for whistleblowing actions set forth in another statute, the
Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act.262 The Sarbanes–
Oxley Act gives oversight of § 806 to the Department of Labor (DOL),
which has since delegated authority to the Secretary of the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).263 Newly promulgated
regulations further elaborate the procedures.264
These regulations require the employee to send notification of the
OSHA complaint to the employer.265 Within twenty days of the initial
filing, the OSHA investigator must allow the alleged violator/employer
the opportunity to respond.266 The investigation will occur only if the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that the adverse employment
action was the result of protected activity and not some other lawful
personnel reason.267 Under a DOL decision, to make out a prima facie
case the whistleblower must establish by a preponderance of the
256. Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 806(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West Supp. 2003)).
257. See Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 2003-SOX-15 (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 28, 2004),
available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/wblower/decsn/03sox15c.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2004)
(adopting the reasonable belief standard as set out in the Act); see supra note 125 and
accompanying text
258. Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 806(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West Supp. 2003)).
259. Id.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See id.; 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b) (2000).
263. See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.101 (2003).
264. See id. §§ 1980.100–1980.115.
265. Id. § 1980.104.
266. Id.
267. Id.
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evidence that (1) the whistleblower engaged in protected activity as
defined by Sarbanes–Oxley, i.e., making a report as described in § 806;
(2) the employer was aware of the protected activity; (3) the
whistleblower suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the
whistleblower raised an inference that the protected activity was a
contributing factor to the adverse employment action.268 If the plaintiff
successfully establishes a prima facie case, the secretary will investigate
and issue a determination in the form of a letter.269 If the secretary finds
there is reasonable cause to believe there has been retaliation, then the
secretary must award “make whole” relief.270
Section 806 also contains a timeline for the administrative
proceeding. If there has been no final decision within 180 days of the
complaint, the plaintiff is entitled to de novo review in federal district
court.271 One commentator has noted that this timeline, while ambitious,
is also unrealistic and the end result may be that defendants will need to
defend the lawsuit in front of two tribunals—once when they begin
proceedings in an administrative forum, and once de novo in district
court, where they will find themselves simply because of the timeline.272
2.

Section 1107: Criminal Penalties for Shooting the Messenger

Other portions of the Act also are concerned with the type of
whistleblowing in which Watkins and Cooper engaged.273 Entitled

268. Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 2003-SOX-15 (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 28, 2004), available
at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/wblower/decsn/03sox15c.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2004).
269. 29 C.F.R § 1980.105.
270. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806(a), 116 Stat. 745, 802–04 (codified
at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West Supp. 2003)). For an excellent general summary of the text of the
DOL’s interim regulations, see Peter M. Panken, SOX Whistleblower Procedures: The Interim DOL
Regulations, A.L.I.-A.B.A CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 496, 472 (2003), available at WL SJ012
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 469.
271. Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 806(a).
272. Allen B. Roberts, Timelines for Sarbanes Oxley Whistleblower Enforcement: Does the
Administrative Procedure Arithmetic Work?, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Nov. 2003, available
at WL 11/03 METCC 26, (col 1).
273. See Brickey, supra note 42, at 359–60 (describing impact of criminal provisions, including
criminal whistleblowing provisions). Brickey concludes that:
Sarbanes–Oxley undoubtedly will not be the last word on corporate governance reform or
punishing criminal fraud. There are no simple solutions to a culture of deceit fueled by greed,
mismanagement, conflicts of interest, and failure of professional and regulatory oversight. But
Sarbanes–Oxley is a constructive step in the right direction. It may fall short, but it sends an
unmistakably clear signal that this should never happen again.
Id. at 381.
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“Retaliation Against Informants,” § 1107 of the Act creates a new
criminal offense of that same name.274 Section 1107 amends an existing
federal statute that deals with violence against witnesses and makes it a
crime to “knowingly, with the intent to retaliate [take] any action
harmful to any person, including interference with the lawful
employment or livelihood of any person, for providing to a law
enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the
commission . . . of any Federal offense . . . .”275 Before this amendment,
the statute applied only to retaliation that caused death, bodily injury, or
damage to property.276
In addition to its application to whistleblowing about securities fraud
and accounting violations, § 1107 also criminalizes retaliation against an
employee who reports any federal offense to law enforcement.277
Further, the language of § 1107 is not limited to publicly traded
companies.278 Indeed, its reach would seemingly encompass every
employer. Section 1107 conceivably criminalizes many actions that have
been wholly civil tort matters, such as retaliation against an employee
who reports violations of Title VII to the EEOC.
One management-side labor and employment law attorney has
referred to § 1107 as “[o]ne of the Act’s potentially most dangerous
sections” because it imposes criminal penalties for run-of-the-mill
whistleblowing cases.279 One feature that distinguishes § 1107 from the
average whistleblower scenario is that criminal penalties attach only if
there is an “intent to retaliate,” the information about the commission of
the federal offense is “truthful information,” and it is provided to a “law
enforcement officer.”280 Further, the effectiveness of this provision is
wholly dependent on the discretion of the prosecutor, which is a separate

274. Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 1107, 116 Stat. 745, 810 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513 (West Supp.
2003)). For discussion and analysis of all of the criminal provisions enacted under Sarbanes–Oxley,
see generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in
Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937 (2003).
275. Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 1107 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513 (West Supp. 2003)).
276. Id.; Victim and Witness Protection Act § 4(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (2000). Perhaps the extension
to employment can be rationalized by recognizing that employment relationship can on some level
be considered a property right. For an example of a work that treats employment in this manner, see
generally Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988).
277. Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 1107 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513 (West Supp. 2003)).
278. See id.
279. Dean J. Schaner, Employment Law Post-Enron, 66 TEX. B.J. 26, 26 (2003).
280. Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 1107.
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topic altogether.281
3.

Section 301: Handling Whistleblower Complaints

Section 301 of the Act, which deals with audit committees, also
affects whistleblowers.282 Section 301(4) requires each company’s audit
committee to establish procedures for “the receipt, retention, and
treatment of complaints received by the issuer regarding accounting,
internal accounting controls, or auditing matters” and “the confidential,
anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of concerns regarding
questionable accounting or auditing matters.”283 This is not phrased in
discretionary terms—every publicly traded company must have a system
in place for receiving anonymous complaints.284
Of course, the “procedures” here are only briefly addressed within
the Act, a flaw that will be discussed and analyzed in Part III of this
Article. As with other sections of the Act, there is a question as to
whether these briefly-mentioned “procedures” for anonymous
complaints must be internal or external. The Act is silent on this point,
and therefore many companies interpret this provision to mean that an
internal system for reporting complaints would suffice.285
III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SARBANES–OXLEY
From the previous section it is clear that Sarbanes–Oxley certainly
has, and will continue to have, an impact upon corporate governance and
securities law. However, the magnitude of the impact is an open
question, and one that the next section critically analyzes. How much of
a change does the Act actually make, and just how much protection are
whistleblowers afforded? Evaluating the changes to employment law

281. See, e.g., Teah R. Lupton, Prosecutorial Discretion, 90 GEO. L.J. 1279, 1279–82 (2002):
Courts recognize a prosecutor’s broad discretion to initiate and conduct criminal prosecutions,
in part out of regard for the separation of powers doctrine and in part because ‘the decision to
prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.’ So long as there is probable cause to
believe that the accused has committed an offense, the decision to prosecute rests within the
prosecutor’s discretion. A prosecutor has far-reaching authority to decide whether to
investigate, grant immunity, or permit a plea bargain, and to determine whether to bring
charges, what charges to bring, when to bring charges, and where to bring charges.
Id. (citations omitted).
282. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West Supp. 2003)).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See infra note 314 and accompanying text.
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assists in determining the effectiveness of the Act. Both of these
analytical and evaluative goals can be answered by an inquiry into the
weaknesses of Sarbanes–Oxley.
After an examination of the Act’s weaknesses, this Article concludes
that Sarbanes–Oxley should have provided more protection for
whistleblowers. First, the Act lacks procedures for responding to a
whistleblower’s report. Second, a whistleblowing case can apparently be
sent to arbitration, a forum that this Article argues weakens the rights of
employees. A detailed analysis of Sarbanes–Oxley supports the
proposition that the Act, a product of political compromise, is far more
limited than the rhetoric accompanying it would indicate.
Sarbanes–Oxley, in its provision of a civil scheme for recovery in
§ 806, is an area-specific statute dealing with fraud at publicly traded
companies. Whistleblowing in other areas is still left with piecemeal
state law coverage, and an employee is either protected or denied
recovery based on the nature of the violation and the happenstance of the
law in the relevant jurisdiction. Given the confusing status of state
whistleblowing law,286 this Article concludes that a general federal
whistleblower protection act would be better policy than the current
patchwork of area-specific statutes.287 Under the reform proposed, an
employee who reported any violation of state or federal law, rule, or
regulation would receive federal civil protection from retaliation.
Further, the law would make it clear that these disputes are not subject to
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration. First, however, the following two
sections of this Article examine the effectiveness of Sarbanes–Oxley’s
whistleblower protections.
A.

Sarbanes–Oxley Fails to Specify Procedures that Employers Must
Follow when Addressing Employee Complaints

The Act fails to detail the procedures employers must follow when
dealing with a whistleblower complaint. Part II.B.3 described § 301 of
the Act, which requires that “[e]ach audit committee shall establish
procedures” for “the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints
received by the issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting

286. See App. A, infra pp. 1087–1120.
287. For the text of a proposed act by the National Whistleblower Center, a whistleblower’s
advocacy group, see The National Whistleblower Protection Act, supra note 151. It is worth noting
that such a model act would be also be beneficial on a state level to provide employees uniform
protections.
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controls, or auditing matters” and “the confidential, anonymous
submission by employees of the issuer of concerns regarding
questionable accounting or auditing matters.”288 However, § 301 fails to
specify what types of procedures are adequate.
Although the law requires a channel for employees to send
anonymous complaints, and the audit committee is supposed to create
procedures for the “retention” and “treatment” of complaints, the Act
does not describe what the “treatment” of such complaints entails.289
Thus, like the proverbial tree in the forest, whistleblowers can report
problems under the Act, but there is no guarantee that anyone—on the
audit committee or otherwise—will necessarily hear them. This
provision creates a “black hole” of sorts, in which anonymous
complaints flow in, but there is no description of what to do with the
complaints once they arrive.
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,290 the U.S. Supreme Court
provided guidance on how best to deal with complaints stemming from
instances of sexual harassment.291 The decision gives employers an
affirmative defense to Title VII liability if they take prompt corrective
action to stop harassment from occurring once it has been reported.292 It
also shields employers from liability if they have in place policies or
procedures that should prevent such harassment from occurring in the
first place.293 No such analogue currently exists for Sarbanes–Oxley
whistleblowing, but one should.
Presumably, in requiring the “treatment” of the anonymous
complaints, § 301 implies that the employer must take at least some sort
of action once it receives a complaint.294 However, because the Act does
not set out specific requirements,295 conceivably the complaints could be
“treated” by marking them with a large red check mark, or moving
288. Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 301.
289. Id.
290. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
291. Id. at 786–92.
292. Id. at 807. See Paul Buchanan & Courtney W. Wiswall, The Evolving Understanding of
Workplace Harassment and Employer Liability: Implications of Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Under Title VII, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 59 (1999); Louis P. DiLorenzo & Laura H.
Harshbarger, Employer Liability for Supervisor Harassment After Ellerth and Faragher, 6 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 3, 8 (1999).
293. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. Such measures might include training employees or providing
human resources staff who know how to address such complaints.
294. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West Supp. 2003)).
295. See id.
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electronic mail into a reviewed folder—the Act does not require the
employer to respond to the complaint in any way. This is not because it
is inherently impossible to respond. One can imagine instances where
even if a complaint is sent anonymously, it is possible to let that
employee know that the feedback has been received and is being
responded to, perhaps by responding to the anonymous e-mail account
or posting an announcement on an electronic bulletin board.
The investigation into mutual fund timing at Putnam Investments
provides one example of the black hole: a whistleblower tried to report
financial fraud but was utterly ignored even after Sarbanes–Oxley.296
The whistleblower, Peter Scannell, reported that institutional investors
were “[buying] shares of international funds late in the day when the
U.S. market is rallying, locking in the daily fund price set at 4 p.m.
Because foreign markets regularly follow the U.S., foreign shares in the
fund will usually rise the next day, producing a higher fund price,
enabling the trader to reap a profit by quickly selling thereafter.”297
Although this procedure was technically legal at the time the scandal
broke, it had the effect of harming long-term mutual fund shareholders
and violated internal policies at Putnam.298 Acknowledging that such
trading hurts returns for shareholders, many funds had falsely stated in
their prospectus or other materials sent to shareholders that they did not
engage in timing.299 Many of the calls for increased action in the
regulation of mutual funds focus on these types of misstatements in fund
disclosures to the public.300
Scannell, an employee at Putnam’s call center in the suburbs of
Boston, remarked on the fact that members of Boilermakers Union,
Local 5, had made thousands of trades in international funds in violation
of Putnam’s internal policies.301 Upon bringing this to the attention of
296. See Karen Damato & Tom Lauricella, Mutual Funds Vow to Fix Their Clocks: Earlier
Deadlines Are Proposed for Investors to Place Orders; Will New Fees Frustrate Them?, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 31, 2003, at C1; John Hechinger, How One Call Taker Spurred the Putnam Mutual Fund
Case, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2003, at C1.
297. See Hechinger, supra note 296, at C13.
298. Id. Since the scandal broke, the SEC has begun considering options for new regulations that
would make the practice of timing illegal. These proposed rules are already drawing controversy
because they involve naming an employee of the mutual fund management company as a
compliance officer. Karen Damato & Michael Schroeder, Can Funds Police Themselves?, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 4, 2003, at C1.
299. See Hechinger, supra note 296, at C1.
300. See Damato & Lauricella, supra note 296, at C15.
301. Hechinger, supra note 296, at C13.
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his two immediate supervisors, Scannell allegedly was told “[t]hat’s
Putnam senior management’s concern.”302 After being ignored internally
and then attacked by a man wielding a brick (according to a police
report, the assailant was wearing a Boilermakers T-shirt), Scannell
eventually turned to the SEC (who initially ignored him) and then to
Massachusetts regulators.303 Regulators have now brought a civil fraud
claim against Putnam in state court.304
Perhaps the only tangible effect of § 301 is that it may well provide
concrete, written evidence, either for government investigators or for
plaintiff’s attorneys prosecuting shareholder derivative lawsuits, of who
knew about a fraud and when they decided to ignore or tacitly assent to
it. A common problem that arises when prosecuting shareholder lawsuits
is that defendants “pass the buck” among themselves. One defendant
will point his or her finger at another corporate defendant and argue that
someone else accounted for revenues improperly or masterminded the
fraud.305 Similar to this argument is the “rogue trader” defense, in which
a high-ranking executive will argue that he or she was ignorant of a
fraudulent practice because it was the fault of an out-of-control “rogue”
subordinate.306 Of course, the typical response307 to this argument is that
302. Id. Although in this instance the Boilermaker’s Union was responsible for the trades, Putnam
apparently admitted that “six of its managers made $700,000 in such trading.” See John Hechinger
& David Armstrong, Mutual Funds Vow to Fix Their Clocks: Putnam Says it Was Subpoenaed for
Papers Tied to Fund Trading; CEO Subject of Internal Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2003, at
C12.
303. Hechinger & Armstrong, supra note 302, at C12.
304. Id.
305. In In re Symbol Technologies, many of the defendants began implicating each other in the
fraud. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Tomo Razmilovic’s Motion to Dismiss the
Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 9, 10, In re Symbol Technologies, Inc. (E.D.N.Y
2003) (No. 02-CIV-1383 (LDW)) (settled without opinion); Defendant Frank Borghese’s Motion to
Dismiss at 4, 12, 13, In re Symbol Technologies, Inc. (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02-CIV-1383 (LDW))
(settled without opinion). The case eventually settled for $139 million, and the former CEO became
a fugitive after his indictment. Michael Weissenstein, Indicted Executive Declared Fugitive,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRE, June 9, 2004, available at 2004 WL 82210148.
306. In In re Reliant Securities, the defendants argued that so-called “round trip” energy trades were
the products of subordinates rather than management. Reliant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Claims Under Sections 10(B) and 20(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section
12(A) of the Securities Act of 1933, and the Texas Securities Act, at 12, 20, In re Reliant Securities
(S.D. Tex. 2003) (No. H-02-1810).
307. Securities fraud lawsuits seem to contain the same archetypal arguments. In response to a
plaintiff’s complaint alleging fraud, defendants will almost always counter with an argument that
the defendants lacked scienter, the required state of mind for proving securities fraud under Rule
10b-5. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004). In response, in their opposition to the motion to dismiss,
plaintiffs often point to specific pieces of evidence that show either that the individual defendant
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a “rogue” subordinate may only engage in such behavior under
inadequate supervision and a lack of proper internal controls.308
It is difficult to discern public companies’ response to § 301. Before
the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, some companies had, on their
own, set up internal “ethics hotlines,” which make sense as a best
practice from a purely economic perspective.309 At the time Enron was
formulating and implementing its byzantine accounting structures, it had
in place a phone hotline that employees could call to report fraud
anonymously.310 Clearly this hotline did not prevent the massive fraud.
The problem, as Sherron Watkins frames it, is that managers were
continuously pushing the edge between acceptable and non-acceptable
accounting practices and that, because of the company culture, no one
wanted to challenge the hierarchy.311 Watkins posits that no one called
the hotline because the border between what was acceptable and what
was illegal had been blurred, and the employees were afraid to speak up
about the situation for fear that they would lose their jobs.312 Watkins
herself initially turned to an anonymous suggestion box to air her
concerns, but then went directly to Ken Lay to discuss them.313
To comply with § 301, many publicly traded companies have hired
companies that specialize in setting up either anonymous hotlines or
electronic mail systems that employees can use to report fraud.314
actively engaged in the fraud or intentionally remained in the dark. Other stock arguments raised by
defendants include the “rogue” trader defense, mentioned in the text, and the frequently used
argument that various statements which later turned out to be unfounded were “mere puffing
statements,” to which the plaintiffs may reply by attempting to argue that the statements were
actually highly material. These various arguments and counterarguments are akin to the canons of
statutory construction. Every clichéd securities fraud argument has its own clichéd response.
308. As auditors must now apprise the audit committee of the details of the internal controls, or lack
thereof, ignorance is no longer a defense. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
§ 404, 116 Stat. 745, 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (West Supp. 2003)).
309. Stephanie Armour, More Companies Urge Workers to Blow the Whistle, USA TODAY,
Dec. 16, 2002, at B1.
310. Interview with Sherron Watkins in Birmingham, Ala. (Feb. 18, 2004).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See Jeffrey Kosseff, Profiting from Corporate Liability, OREGONIAN, Apr. 10, 2003, at D1.
(describing the business of Ethicspoint, a company that allows employees to report instances of
“embezzlement, conflicts of interest and other corporate misdeeds to a system that sends complaints
to an independent manager, a board member or outside auditor” and Pinkerton Compliance
Services, which runs a more traditional phone-based reporting system); Charles Lunan, Law
Prompts Business Boom: Accountants, Lawyers and Ethics Consultants Rush to Help Companies
Comply with the Sarbanes–Oxley Reform Act, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 25, 2003, at 1E
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Common sense, as well as the results of one worker survey, indicates
that people perceive anonymous hotlines as more “trustworthy” when
they are maintained and monitored by a third-party,” and therefore those
hotlines receive more calls than internal hotlines.315 Given the
disapproval and reprisals that whistleblowers face,316 it is not surprising
that some workers are reluctant to give up their anonymity. Thus, while
§ 301 improves the pre-existing regime, which did not require any action
whatsoever of the employers, it is still not likely to be effective and
certainly is not a revolutionary change.
B. Mandatory Arbitration and Whistleblowing Claims
The effectiveness of any statute depends on the remedies available to
successful plaintiffs. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the remedies
whistleblowers are entitled to in the event of retaliation. While § 806 of
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act authorizes “make whole” relief to employees
who have been fired because of protected whistleblowing activity,317
many of these cases may never reach an administrative tribunal or a
federal court. Rather, many Sarbanes–Oxley whistleblowing cases, like
many employment discrimination cases, will probably be sent to
mandatory arbitration.318 My earlier work describes many of the
problems associated with such mandatory arbitration: perceived
employer bias; fewer options available to the employee regarding where
to bring suit; and limitations on discovery.319 All of these factors
decrease the settlement value of a plaintiff’s case and, as a result,

(reporting growth of Pinkerton Compliance Services, including an increase from 780 publiccompany clients to 900 in the last year); see also Whistleblower Hotline, at
http://www.shareholder.com/home/Solutions/Whistleblower.cfm (last visited Oct. 7, 2004)
(advertising secure hotline system free of “human intervention”).
315. Ernst & Young, supra note 5 (reporting results of survey that concluded that while only thirty
percent of workers would report fraud to management by means of an anonymous telephone call,
that percentage rose by an additional twenty-seven percent if there was a telephone hotline
administered by a third-party).
316. See supra Part I.B.3.
317. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802–04 (codified at
18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West Supp. 2003)).
318. Miriam A. Cherry, Note, Not-So-Arbitrary Arbitration: Using Title VII Disparate Impact
Analysis to Invalidate Employment Contracts that Discriminate, 21 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 267, 229
n.12 (1998); Voluntary Arbitration in Worker Disputes Endorsed by 2 Groups, WALL ST. J., June
20, 1997, at B2 (estimating that “more than 3.5 million employees are covered by arbitration
agreements with the American Arbitration Association alone”).
319. Cherry, supra note 318, at 276–86.
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undermine the federal protections granted to employees.320 The
Sarbanes–Oxley Act fails to address this issue, and that failure is yet
another weakness of the Act.
1.

Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court: From Skeptic to
Supporter

Before the early 1990s, courts did not enforce pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration contracts for statutory employment claims.321 However, in
recent years, there has been a complete doctrinal reversal, and courts
now view mandatory arbitration contracts favorably.322 The U.S.
Supreme Court cases decided during the last twenty years are the most
critical to understanding the current state of the law on mandatory
arbitration contracts. In the 1974 decision Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co.,323 the Court refused to send a Title VII claim to mandatory
arbitration.324 However, the Court later endorsed mandatory arbitration
of statutory claims in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.325 and
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.326
In Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a
plaintiff suing under Title VII for race discrimination retained an
independent right to be heard in federal court, despite his or her
participation in an arbitration scheme established under a collective
bargaining agreement.327 The Court reasoned that restricting plaintiffs to
arbitration would interfere with both the EEOC and the individual
litigant’s role as a private attorney general in enforcing Title VII.328 The
pervasive line of reasoning in the opinion, however, is that the federal
courts have plenary power over, and are the most competent to hear,
Title VII claims.329 The Court stated that “final responsibility for

320. Id.
321. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974).
322. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119, 123 (2001).
323. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
324. Id. at 59–60.
325. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
326. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
327. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 59–60.
328. Id. at 44–45 (“Congress gave private individuals a significant role in the enforcement process
of Title VII . . . . [T]he private litigant not only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the
important congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices.”).
329. Id. at 45.
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enforcement of Title VII is vested with federal courts.”330 The Court
compared Title VII litigation and arbitration and ultimately held
exclusive arbitration proceedings inappropriate for resolving Title VII
claims.331 The Court cited the limited discovery, the inapplicability of
rules of evidence, and the overall informality of an arbitration
proceeding as defects that prevented arbitration from being an exclusive
remedy for a Title VII plaintiff.332 In addition, the Court also pointed to
the arbitrator’s lack of “general authority to invoke public laws that
conflict with the bargain between the parties”333 and possibly limited
expertise with employment discrimination lawsuits.334 Taken as a whole,
the Gardner-Denver decision evinced a strong hostility to the exclusive
arbitration of Title VII claims.
The Gilmer decision, in 1991, involved a claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).335 The plaintiff, a manager
in the securities industry, had signed a pre-dispute mandatory arbitration
clause as required by the New York Stock Exchange.336 The Court held
that the arbitration clause was enforceable and could constitute an
exclusive remedy.337 The Court, however, did not overrule GardnerDenver, but chose instead to distinguish it by stressing that GardnerDenver involved a collective bargaining agreement.338 According to the
Gilmer Court, the operative distinction in Gardner-Denver was that the
union had traded away the individual plaintiff’s rights under Title VII.339
In Gilmer, no such collective/individual tensions were present because it
involved merely a contract with an individual employee, not a union.340
This result seems somewhat paradoxical, as the plaintiff in Gilmer
330. Id. at 44.
331. Id. at 56–60.
332. Id. at 57–58.
333. Id. at 53.
334. Id. at 57 (“[T]he specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop,
not the law of the land.”).
335. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). For examples of pre-Gilmer
decisions where lower courts generally assumed that Title VII claims, whether in the collective
bargaining or contractual context, were non-arbitrable under Gardner-Denver, see Utley v.
Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 185 (1st Cir. 1989); Swenson v. Mgmt. Recruiters Int’l, Inc.,
858 F.2d 1304, 1305–07 (8th Cir. 1988).
336. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 35.
339. See id.
340. Id. at 23.
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probably had less bargaining power due to the absence of a union.
Then in Circuit City, a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court spoke
definitively about the validity of mandatory arbitration in the
employment context.341 After analyzing the text of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA),342 the Court concluded that the exception
contained within the FAA for certain contracts of employment applied
only to transportation workers.343 In making this determination, the court
stated that “arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA
without contravening the policies of congressional enactments giving
employees specific protection against discrimination prohibited by
federal law . . . .”344
This pro-arbitration decision was tempered by the Court’s opinion in
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc.345
There, the Court held that even though the plaintiff had signed a
mandatory arbitration contract, the contract did not preclude the EEOC
from pursuing an enforcement action for victim-specific relief.346 One
major criticism of arbitration has been that it tracks employees raising
civil rights violations into individualized arbitrations, as opposed to class
actions.347 This sort of tracking apparently precluded any hope of
correcting systemic civil rights violations in the workplace, and many
commentators had previously criticized arbitration on that basis alone.348
In Waffle House, the Supreme Court apparently recognized the
limitations of private contracts in the face of a statutory and regulatory
scheme to end disability discrimination.
However, on the whole, the overwhelming impression that one
derives from the Circuit City and Waffle House decisions is that courts
have shifted from viewing mandatory pre-dispute arbitration contracts
with suspicion to distinctly favoring them. In part this can be explained
by the fact that enforcing mandatory arbitration contracts frees the
federal courts from having to deal with a considerable volume of

341. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001).
342. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000).
343. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119.
344. Id. at 123.
345. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
346. Id. at 297.
347. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action,
Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000).
348. See, e.g., id.
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employment litigation.349 Arbitration of consumer claims and
employment claims, among others, has become more widespread in
response to increased enforcement of mandatory arbitration contracts.350
In light of this doctrinal background, a statute must clearly preclude
mandatory arbitration, or the court will assume that the statutory claim is
one that can be sent to arbitration.
It is worth noting that Circuit City was decided over a strongly
worded dissent joined by three justices. Their strongest argument was
that in 1925, when the FAA was passed, Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause was limited, and that Congress never intended to
sweep all of these disputes into arbitration.351 Given how polarized the
Court has been in recent years, and the complete doctrinal reversal
detailed above, it is difficult to predict what direction the Supreme Court
will take in the future.
2.

Will Sarbanes–Oxley Whistleblowing Claims Be Sent to
Arbitration?

With this background, it is necessary to ask whether the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act evinces a Congressional intent to preclude pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration contracts to determine whether Sarbanes–Oxley
whistleblowing claims will be sent to arbitration. The Supreme Court, in
Gilmer, established a general presumption in favor of mandatory
arbitration.352 The decision, however, mentions the text, legislative
history, and purposes of an act as ways to rebut that presumption.353
Essentially, the Gilmer and Circuit City line of decisions changed the
default rule. Whereas it used to be assumed that a plaintiff could avail
himself or herself of all of the remedies in the statute to the fullest
349. See John J. Donohue, III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 985 (1991) (cataloging 2166% rise in employment
discrimination filings between 1970 and 1989).
350. See Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 89–90 (documenting rise of arbitration clauses in
the consumer context and presenting arguments in favor of such clauses).
351. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 131–32 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
352. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
353. Id.; see also Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987)
(indicating that a party may use text, legislative history, and underlying purposes of a statute to
rebut the presumption that an arbitration “agreement” will be enforceable); Rosenberg v. Merrill
Lynch, 995 F. Supp. 190, 204 (D. Mass. 1998) (“Instead of overruling Gilmer . . . Congress could
merely follow [Gilmer’s] . . . suggestion . . . and make clear its intent to preclude enforcement of
pre-dispute arbitration . . . .”), aff’d, 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999).
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extent, now a presumption in favor of arbitration means that Congress
must affirmatively insert language into every act where mandatory
arbitration is not to be used.354
The analysis of whether a § 806 claim is subject to arbitration begins
with the text of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, which is silent on the subject of
mandatory arbitration. Although one certainly could argue that Congress
created its own scheme of enforcement through criminal penalties in
§ 1107 and civil private rights of action under § 806, neither of which
explicitly includes mandatory arbitration, the Supreme Court foreclosed
this argument in Gilmer and Circuit City.355 Under these decisions, when
Congress does not explicitly speak to the question of mandatory
arbitration, courts are supposed to apply a presumption in its favor.356
Without express guidance in the text, one must analyze the legislative
history. Earlier drafts of the Act included a provision within the
whistleblowing section that banned mandatory arbitration.357 However,
those portions of the bill were excised in committee, with no clear
rationale emerging for why they were cut.358 Nevertheless, the
committee did eliminate the provision, which does not bode well for a
plaintiff arguing for his or her day in court.
With no express textual support and negative legislative history, the
best argument that the Act did not contemplate mandatory arbitration for
Sarbanes–Oxley whistleblowing claims must therefore focus on
legislative intent. Congress would have been cognizant of the important
role of whistleblowers in preventing corporate fraud because Sherron
Watkins testified before congressional committees prior to the passage

354. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. The burden is on the plaintiff to:
show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum . . . . If such an intention
exists, it will be discoverable in the text[,] . . . its legislative history, or an ‘inherent conflict’
between arbitration and the ADEA’s underlying purposes . . . . Throughout such an inquiry, it
should be kept in mind that ‘questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard
for the federal policy favoring arbitration.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
355. Id. at 23; Circuit City, 632 U.S. at 109.
356. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109.
357. An earlier version of the bill contained a provision that stated: “No employee may be
compelled to adjudicate his or her rights under this section pursuant to an arbitration agreement.” S.
2010, 107th Cong. § 7 (2002). A bill introduced in the House contained identical language, and
would have prevented whistleblowing claims from being sent to arbitration. H.R. 4098, 107th Cong.
§ 8 (2002).
358. The final version of the bill did not mention arbitration. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802–04 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West Supp. 2003)).
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of the Act.359 Indeed, it was such an important issue to Congress that
legislators made retaliation against whistleblowers a crime punishable by
ten years imprisonment.360 Under EEOC v. Waffle House, a government
agency can perform investigations and bring an action for violation of a
statute, despite the presence of a mandatory arbitration contract or any
other private agreement with an individual employee.361 Therefore, even
if courts enforce mandatory arbitration for § 806 claims, the government
could still bring a criminal action under § 1107.
In Boss v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.,362 the district court examined
whether whistleblowing claims under § 806 of Sarbanes–Oxley could be
arbitrated.363 The plaintiff, Kenneth Boss, worked as a research analyst
at Smith Barney.364 Boss alleged that, in violation of the company’s
internal rules and procedures, Smith Barney ordered him to give a draft
research report to its investment bankers.365 The investment bankers
allegedly urged Boss to change his research findings after receiving the
report.366 Boss alleged that Salomon Smith Barney terminated his
employment when he refused to change the report and complained to
supervisors.367 These are serious allegations, because, as noted in Part
II.A, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act prohibits investment bankers from
interfering with the research reports written by analysts within their
organizations.368
Boss wanted to have his Sarbanes–Oxley whistleblowing claim heard
in federal court, but he had signed a mandatory arbitration contract.369
This contract was one of the routine forms Smith Barney required
employees to sign upon joining the firm.370 Boss had also executed a
U-4, the registration form required by the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD), which requires that employees arbitrate their
359. See Hearings, supra note 26, at 14–67 (testimony of Sherron Watkins).
360. Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 1107 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513 (West Supp. 2003)).
361. EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002).
362. 263 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
363. Id. at 684.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 501, 116 Stat. 745, 791–93 (codified at
15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-6 (West Supp. 2003)).
369. Boss, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 684.
370. Id.
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disputes.371 Indeed, this was the very form contract at issue in the Gilmer
case.372
In a rather conclusory analysis of the issue, the district court granted
Smith Barney’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that “[t]here is
nothing in the text of the statute or the legislative history of the
Sarbanes–Oxley [A]ct evincing intent to preempt arbitration of claims
under the act.”373 Further, the court ruled that there was no “‘inherent
conflict’ between arbitration and the [statute’s] . . . purposes.”374
Ultimately, the court refused to hear Boss’s whistleblowing claim, and
instead sent the case to arbitration with the NASD.375 The court’s
disposal of the issue in such a brief fashion flows from the Supreme
Court jurisprudence on mandatory arbitration and the failure of Congress
to mention arbitration specifically in Sarbanes–Oxley. The court
apparently assumed that Congress would be aware of the legal landscape
that currently favors arbitration and would also be aware of the fact that,
if there was no mention of mandatory arbitration, courts would assume
that arbitration was an adequate remedy.376
As I have argued elsewhere, arbitration of employment disputes
should be taken with a healthy dose of skepticism, as arbitration in
general tends to favor the employer.377 Many arguments, both for
(efficiency) and against (fairness), have been raised regarding the use of
mandatory arbitration contracts.378 Despite the Supreme Court’s
371. Id. at 685.
372. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
373. Boss, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 685.
374. Id. (quoting Oldroyd v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 134 F.3d 72, 77–78 (2d Cir. 1998)) (alteration in
original).
375. Id.
376. An article that appeared in The Wall Street Journal recounts a case with whistleblower issues
in the context of a severance agreement. Michael Orey, WorldCom-Inspired ‘Whistle Blower’ Law
Has Weaknesses, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2002, at B1. According to the article, Kim Emigh, a former
financial analyst for WorldCom, sued the company alleging that he was forced to keep false
financial records. Id. Emigh admitted he signed a waiver with WorldCom when he got his severance
pay, but argued that he revoked the waiver and never cashed WorldCom’s check. Id. Nothing in
§ 806, however, prevents an employee from waiving his or her right to sue in exchange for a
monetary settlement. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745,
802–04 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West Supp. 2003)).
377. See Cherry, supra note 318, at 276–86. One certainty exists: because arbitration results in a
reduction of the procedural protections available to employees and does not guarantee a
decisionmaker versed in federal employment law, it tends to reduce the settlement value of a
plaintiff’s case. Id.
378. For a summary of the various arguments, see id.; Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as
Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE
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imprimatur of approval in Circuit City, there is still an argument that
arbitration of Sarbanes–Oxley whistleblowing claims should not be
foisted on employees at the time of hire, when economic realities dictate
that it will be a one-sided negotiation. Indeed, as I have queried
elsewhere, if the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement values
fair process and a mutual meeting of the minds to bargain for a fair
solution to underlying goals, then the values of the movement are not
consonant with mandatory arbitration. That is because mandatory
arbitration is not the result of parties determining that ADR is the best
way to resolve a dispute; rather, it is a one-sided provision foisted upon
employees through a contract of adhesion.379
An employee can argue the arbitration point in two ways. First, the
Boss case may have been wrongly decided based on the purposes of the
statute and the other protections Sarbanes–Oxley provided to
whistleblowers.380 On the other hand, if the Boss case was correctly
decided because the Supreme Court favors arbitration,381 then Congress
made a mistake in not providing whistleblowers with more protection.
Either way, a realistic view is that these Sarbanes–Oxley whistleblower
cases will be sent to arbitration, as was the case in Boss.382 The fact that
mandatory arbitration of these claims will be the likely result is a serious
weakness in the Act.383
C.

Conclusions and Suggested Law Reform

In light of the forgoing discussion, what effect has Sarbanes–Oxley
had on corporate governance? What effect will Sarbanes–Oxley have on
L. REV. 195, 196–206 (1998); Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25
HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 109–29 (1996).
379. See Miriam A. Cherry, Case Comment, A Negotiation Analysis of Mandatory Arbitration
Contracts, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 269, 277–80 (1999).
380. See supra Part II.B.
381. See EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002).
382. Boss v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 684, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
383. The last apparent weakness in the Act’s treatment of whistleblowers is the allocation of agency
oversight of § 806 to OSHA, rather than to the SEC. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802–04 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West Supp. 2003)). The
SEC is uniformly viewed as the expert agency when it comes to issues of securities violations. In
the face of this expertise, giving oversight to OSHA is puzzling. See Deborah Solomon, For
Financial Whistle-Blowers, New Shield Is an Imperfect One, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2004, at A1
(pointing out OSHA’s lack of expertise in accounting matters as well as its limited authority to
subpoena witnesses). However, because OSHA does have experience with workplace disputes and
other whistleblowing statutes, the question of OSHA’s effectiveness is an open one.
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the Sherron Watkinses and Cynthia Coopers of the world?
Unfortunately, the answer to both of these questions seems to be “not as
much as it should.” The promise of Sarbanes–Oxley is its seeming
federalization of state retaliatory discharge law regarding accounting
fraud, but its weakness is in the remedies provided.
Employers must take action to deal with employee complaints of the
type that both Cooper and Watkins made, and yet the precise mode of
dealing with such complaints is not specified in the Act. Information can
seemingly be sent into a void, and yet an employer will still comply with
the letter of the law. Further, whistleblowing complaints under
Sarbanes–Oxley can be sent to arbitration, a forum that provides
inadequate remedies for employees. Some retaliatory actions are now
considered criminal—even though the underlying employment action
could be sent to mandatory arbitration. In short, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act
provides a strange combination of tort, criminal, employment, and
alternative dispute resolution issues in its reform of federal securities
laws.
If Sarbanes–Oxley had been in force at the time of the scandals, what
would have been the fate of the two whistleblowers, Watkins and
Cooper? Those at the top of the Enron hierarchy could still have asked
outside counsel about the company’s ability to fire Sherron Watkins, but
after Sarbanes–Oxley, the answer would be that Enron could not fire
Watkins for reporting her concerns.384 That answer would be definitive
and would no longer depend on the vagaries of the Texas public policy
exception. If Watkins had been fired or another adverse employment
action taken against her for making such a report, Enron could have
faced a lawsuit for retaliatory discharge under § 806.385 The suit would
likely have resulted in Enron providing Watkins with “make whole”
relief.386 Further, after her testimony, any participants in her firing could
have faced criminal charges under § 1107.387
In that respect, Sarbanes–Oxley is an advance for conscientious
employees, and a further movement away from the at-will employment
rule. However, § 806 is an area-specific whistleblowing statute; it
applies only to fraud.388 There are still many other areas where

384. Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 806.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id. § 1107 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513 (West Supp. 2003)).
388. Id. § 806 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West Supp. 2003)).

1084

CHERRY ZEN

Employee Whistleblowing After Sarbanes–Oxley
employees may feel compelled to report violations of a state or federal
rule or regulation, and such reports would be in the public interest, yet
employees could be dismissed from their positions, harassed, or
otherwise retaliated against. The survey in Appendix I389 and Appendix
II390 indicates that in many jurisdictions without broad whistleblower
protection statutes, or where judicial decisions have given such statutes
narrow application, it is relatively easy for an employee’s
whistleblowing claim to fall through the cracks.
Law reform, then, should include uniform federal protection for
whistleblowers who report any violation of federal law or regulation to
law enforcement. This is with the caveat that there should be an “escape
clause” for such things as reporting that someone in the company was
involved in an essentially technical violation. This protection could
cover workplaces over a certain size—perhaps fifteen, as is the case with
Title VII391—and would not depend on either the vagaries of the type of
wrongdoing that is being reported or the jurisdiction in which the
whistleblower happens to live. Such protection would have a positive
impact not only on the individual whistleblowers who receive direct
protection under the law, but also on the enforcement of federal statutes.
A uniform statement of state law, standardizing the types of dismissal
that are against public policy, would also be a positive development.
In conclusion, Sarbanes–Oxley will have an impact on employment
law. The Act federalizes (and, indeed, potentially criminalizes) an entire
swath of activity that (depending upon state statutes and common law)
might not have even been actionable as a civil tort under the previous
legal regime. On the other hand, the Act does not provide adequate
remedies, which provokes the question whether the Act will result in the
right mix of incentives and disincentives for the optimal amount of
whistleblowing.392
Part of the whistleblower’s decision depends on the incentives or
disincentives the law provides. Worker behavior tends to be influenced
by the applicable law. However, whistleblowing behavior is partially a
matter of individual conscience. Would the passage of Sarbanes–Oxley
have influenced Watkins’s decision to write her letter? She decided to
389. See App. A, infra pp. 1087–1120.
390. See App. B, infra pp. 1121–23.
391. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
392. This optimal amount would be defined as a level of whistleblowing that will result in an
appropriate level of reporting to deter wrongdoing, but without unduly disrupting the internal
functioning of businesses with erroneous or inaccurate reports.
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make her report, knowing that she faced firing, demotion, or other forms
of retaliation—knowing that there would likely be no recourse or
remedy in law against Enron.393 In a way, it seems that Watkins, like
many whistleblowers, felt an obligation to make a report regardless of
any protection that the legal system would afford her. At the same time,
those who are on the margins, those employees who are trying to decide
if reporting illegal activity is worth losing their jobs, may be influenced
if they know that retaliatory discharges are against the law.
Ultimately, the law should support those who are willing to make
personal sacrifices for the public good and increase support for those
who blow the whistle. The law should protect whistleblowers so that the
high social price they have to pay is eased, not compounded. Cynthia
Cooper recently gave some advice to a graduating class from her alma
mater, Mississippi State University. Her speech focused on an
employee’s sense of honor, and her comment to students was that they
should “[do] what you know is right even if there may be a price to be
paid.”394 Employment law doctrine should provide full support for such
ethics and integrity.

393. Interview with Sherron Watkins in Birmingham, Ala. (Feb. 18, 2004).
394. Scott Waller, ‘Do what . . . is right’: Whistleblower Tells Students to Have Personal Integrity,
CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Nov. 18, 2003, at C1.
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APPENDIX A
This Appendix summarizes, by state, the applicable causes of action
for whistleblowing, listing and briefly describing every state
whistleblowing statute that is potentially relevant to disclosure of
information by employees. In addition, this Appendix briefly lists
relevant caselaw from each jurisdiction and any pertinent secondary
material particular to that state. This Appendix owes a debt to Callahan
and Dworkin’s survey of fifty states, supra note 80, at 107–08.
ALABAMA: Alabama does not recognize a public policy exception
for private employees. See, e.g., Salter v. Alfa Ins. Co., 561 So. 2d 1050,
1053 (Ala. 1990); Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131
(Ala. 1977). However, state employees are protected if the employee
reports “under oath or in the form of an affidavit, a violation of a law, a
regulation, or a rule . . . to a public body” or reports a code of ethics
violation. ALA. CODE § 36-26A-3 (2001); id. § 36-25-24 (providing
protection to state employees who report code of ethics violation); see
State Employees Protection Act, id. §§ 36-26A-1 to -7.
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: ALA. CODE § 25-1-28 (2000)
(unlawful employment practice—age discrimination); id. § 25-5-11.1
(filing for worker’s compensation or reporting violation of safety rule in
writing); id. § 25-8-57 (child labor).
Secondary source: Blaine C. Stevens, Note, Employment at Will:
The Time Has Come for Alabama to Embrace Public Policy as an
Exception to the Rule of Employment at Will, 19 CUMB. L. REV. 373
(1989).
ALASKA: Alaska recognizes a public policy exception for private
and public employees, as well as an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. See Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 782 P.2d 1155,
1158 (Alaska 1989); Knight v. Am. Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788,
792 (Alaska 1986). The Alaska Whistleblower Act protects a public
employee who “reports to a public body or is about to report to a public
body a matter of public concern” or “participates in a court action, an
investigation, a hearing, or an inquiry held by a public body on a matter
of public concern.” Alaska Whistleblower Act, ALASKA STAT.
§§ 39.90.100–.150 (Michie 2002 & Supp. 2003); see also ALASKA
STAT. § 23.40.110 (Michie 2002) (unfair labor practices—public
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employment).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: ALASKA STAT. § 18.60.089
(Michie 2002) (occupational safety and health); id. § 18.80.220
(unlawful employment practice—discrimination); ALASKA STAT.
§ 23.10.135 (Michie 2002) (Wage and Hour Act); ALASKA STAT.
§ 24.60.035 (Michie 2002) (reports to legislative ethics committee or
other government entity); ALASKA STAT. § 39.28.070 (Michie Supp.
2003) (affirmative action or equal employment opportunity); ALASKA
STAT. § 42.40.760 (Michie 2002) (unfair labor practices—Alaska
Railroad Corporation); ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.120 (Michie 2002)
(vulnerable adults); id. § 47.35.105 (social services for children,
maternity homes); id. § 47.62.040 (long-term care).
ARIZONA: Prior to 1996, Arizona unequivocally recognized a
public policy exception for wrongful termination. See Wagner v. City of
Globe, 722 P.2d 250, 257 (Ariz. 1986); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale
Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1033 (Ariz. 1985). However, after the
passage of the Arizona Employee Protection Act (AEPA) in 1996,
“[w]hether a common law tort for wrongful termination still exists after
the AEPA is an open and much debated question in Arizona law.” Galati
v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 69 P.3d 1011, 1015 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003);
Arizona Employee Protection Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 23-1501 to 231502 (2003). The AEPA protects employees who report violations of
“the Constitution of Arizona or the statutes of this state . . . .” ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 23-1501(3)(c)(ii) (2003). Public employees are further
protected if they provide a public body with “information of a matter of
public concern” involving violations of law, “[m]ismanagement, a gross
waste of monies or an abuse of authority.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 38-532
(2003); see also id. §§ 38-531 to 38-534 (disclosure of information by
public employees); id. § 23-1411 (testimony by public safety
employees).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 3-376
(2003) (pesticide control); id. § 3-3120 (occupational safety and
health—agricultural employment); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-329 (2003)
(minimum wages for minors); id. § 23-425 (occupational safety and
health); id. § 23-1385 (unfair labor practices—agricultural employees);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2282 (2003) (health care facility employees—
infant care); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1378 (2003) (ombudsman-citizens
aide); id. § 41-1464 (discrimination in employment); id. § 41-1492.10
(public accommodation and services); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 49-207, 49-
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288 (2003) (water quality control).
Case law: McDonald v. Campbell, 821 P.2d 139 (Ariz. 1991).
Secondary source: Marzetta Jones, Note, The 1996 Arizona
Employment Protection Act: A Return to the Employment-at-Will
Doctrine, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1139 (1997).
ARKANSAS: Arkansas provides a public policy exception to the
employment-at-will rule. Island v. Buena Vista Resort, 103 S.W.3d 671,
679 (Ark. 2003); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385
(Ark. 1988). The Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act protects public
employees who make good-faith reports about waste and violations of
law “to an appropriate authority.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-1-603 (Michie
1987); see Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act, id. §§ 21-1-601 to 21-1-609;
see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-1010 (Public Employees’ Chemical
Right to Know Act) (Michie 1987).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-55-113
(Michie 1987) (Medicaid fraud—provision for reward); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-28-405(f)(1) (Michie 1987) (retaliation grounds for
revocation/denial of child welfare agency license); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 11-3-204 (Michie 1987) (references to prospective employers—
retaliation causes loss of immunity for employers); id. § 11-4-206
(minimum wage law); id. § 11-4-608 (wage discrimination); id. § 11-10106 (employment security); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-108 (Michie
1987 & Supp. 2003) (Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993); id. § 16-123208 (fair housing); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-10-1007 (Michie 1987) (longterm care facilities and services).
CALIFORNIA: California recognizes a public policy exception for
at-will employees, often referred to as a Tameny claim. See Green v.
Ralee Eng’g Co., 960 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Cal. 1998); Tameny v. Atl.
Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1335–37 (Cal. 1980). Private and public
employees are protected if the employee reports violations of state or
federal statutes and regulations to “a government or law enforcement
agency.” CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West 2003). State employees are
also protected if reporting “an improper governmental activity or . . . any
condition that may significantly threaten the health or safety of
employees or the public . . . .” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8547.2 (West 1992
& Supp. 2004); see California Whistleblower Protection Act, id.
§§ 8547–8547.12; see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 19702 (West 1995 &
Supp. 2004) (discrimination in public employment); CAL. GOV’T CODE
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§ 53298 (West 1997) (local government employees).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 2056 (West 2003) (physicians advocating for medically appropriate
health care); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7583.46 (West Supp. 2004)
(private patrol operator); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 9998.6 (West
1995) (foreign workers); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44040 (West 1993)
(school district employees—appearance before certain boards or
committees); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44114 (West 1993 & Supp. 2004)
(school employees—improper governmental activities); CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 87039 (West 2002) (community college district employee—
appearance before certain boards or committees); id. § 87164
(community college employees—improper governmental activities);
CAL. FIN. CODE § 6530 (West 1999) (savings associations); CAL. GOV’T
CODE §§ 9149.20–9149.23 (West Supp. 2004) (disclosure of improper
governmental activities to legislative committee); CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 12653 (West 1992) (false claims actions); id. § 12940 (unlawful
employment practices—discrimination); id. § 12944 (retaliation by
licensing board); id. § 12945.2 (family care leave); id. § 19251.5
(communication with Legislature); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 444.22 (West 1990 & Supp. 2004) (communication with consumer
health hotlines); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1278.5 (West 2000)
(care, services, or conditions of health care facilities); id. § 1317.4
(report of violations—health facilities); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1432 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004) (long-term health care facilities);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1539 (West 2000) (inspection of
community care facilities); id. § 1568.07 (inspection of residential care
facilities for persons with chronic life-threatening illnesses); id.
§ 1569.37 (inspection of residential care facilities for the elderly); id.
§ 1581 (inspection of adult day health care centers); id. § 1596.881
(child day care facilities); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17031.7
(West 1984) (employee community housing); CAL. INS. CODE § 1871.7
(West 1993 & Supp. 2004) (fraudulent insurance claims action); CAL.
LAB. CODE § 98.6 (West 2003) (exercise of employee rights); id. § 132a
(testimony in co-employee’s workers’ compensation case); CAL. LAB.
CODE § 752 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004) (complaint regarding election—
smelters and underground workings); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1153 (West.
2003) (unfair labor practices—agricultural employers); id. § 6310
(occupational safety and health); id. § 6399.7 (hazardous substances
information and training); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 73.7 (West Supp.
2004) (veterans programs); CAL. PENAL CODE § 6129 (West 2000 &
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Supp. 2004) (state correctional system—improper government
activities); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1237 (West Supp. 2004)
(unemployment compensation); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5550
(West 1998) (mental health care); id. § 9715 (long-term care).
Case law: Hoefer v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (C.D.
Cal. 2000).
Secondary source: Jennifer Vanse, Comment, California Wrongful
Discharge Law Turns Toward the Plaintiff, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 281 (2000).
COLORADO: Colorado recognizes a public policy exception to the
at-will employment rule. See Flores v. Am. Pharm. Servs., Inc., 994 P.2d
455, 458–59 (Colo. 1999). State employees are protected when
disclosing information “regarding any action, policy, regulation,
practice, or procedure, including, but not limited to, the waste of public
funds, abuse of authority, or mismanagement of any state agency.”
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-50.5-102 (West 2003); see id. §§ 24-50.5101 to 24-50.5-107 (state employee protection).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 82.5-101 (West 2003) (communication with general assembly or court of
law); id. § 8-3-108 (unfair labor practices—Labor Peace Act); id. § 8-4120 (wages); id. § 8-6-115 (minimum wage); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-34-402 (West 2003) (discriminatory or unfair employment
practices); id. § 24-114-102 (private enterprise employee protection);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-3.1-102 (West 2003) (abuse of at-risk
adult); id. § 26-3.1-204 (financial exploitation of at-risk adult); id. § 2611.5-109 (long-term care); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3.1-604 (West
2003) (state military forces—complaints of wrongs).
Case law: Lanes v. O’Brien, 746 P.2d 1366 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
CONNECTICUT: Connecticut recognizes a public policy exception
to the at-will employment rule. See Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods,
Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 388–89 (Conn. 1980). Public and private employees
are protected if the employee reports violations of laws or regulations to
a public body. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51m (2003). State employees
(and employees of large state contractors) are also protected if the
employee provides information to the Auditor of Public Accounts or the
state Attorney General. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4-61dd (2003); see also
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-272 (2003) (collective bargaining—state
employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-470 (2003) (collective bargaining–
municipal employees).
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Area-specific whistleblower statutes: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4-37j
(2003) (whistleblower protection for foundation employees); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 10-153e (2003) (certified professional employees—
education); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-8a (2003) (public service
companies); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101e (2003) (child abuse or
neglect); id. § 17b-410 (long-term care); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-532
(2003) (nursing home facilities); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-40d (2003)
(employers who use or produce carcinogens); id. § 31-40t (hazardous
conditions); id. § 31-51pp (family and medical leave); id. § 31-69
(testimony before wage board); id. § 31-69b (wages; state contracts); id.
§ 31-76 (wage discrimination); id. § 31-105 (unfair labor practices—
Labor Relations Act); id. § 31-226a (unemployment compensation); id.
§ 31-379 (occupational safety and health); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-13e
(2003) (Victim Advocate); id. § 46a-13n (Child Advocate); id. § 46a-60
(discriminatory employment practice); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-85b
(2003) (testimony in any criminal proceeding); id. § 54-203 (victim
appearing as witness in any criminal proceeding).
DELAWARE: In Delaware, termination in violation of public policy
is actionable on the basis of a “limited implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing . . . .” Lord v. Souder, 748 A.2d 393, 400 (Del. 2000);
see also Schatzman v. Martin Newark Dealership, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 2d
392, 398 (D. Del. 2001); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman,
679 A.2d 436, 440–41 (Del. 1996). Public employees are protected if the
employee makes a report to an elected official of a violation of a law or
regulation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115 (1997); see also DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 14, § 4007 (1999) (unfair labor practices—public schools);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1307 (1995) (unfair labor practices—Public
Employment Relations Act).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1208
(Supp. 2002) (false claims actions); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1117
(2003) (nursing facilities); id. § 1135 (nursing facilities—abuse, neglect,
mistreatment, or financial exploitation); id. § 1154 (investigations—
long-term care); id. § 2415 (hazardous chemicals); id. § 2907 (Clean
Indoor Air Act); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 509 (1995 & Supp. 2002)
(child labor); id. tit. 19, § 704 (polygraph testing); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
19, § 707 (1995) (meal breaks); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 718 (1995 &
Supp. 2002) (discrimination in employment); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 726 (1995) (handicapped persons employment protections); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 735 (1995 & Supp. 2002) (right to inspect
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personnel files); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 910 (1995) (minimum
wage); id. § 1112 (wage payment and collection); id. § 1607 (unfair
labor practices—police officers and firefighters); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
19, § 2365 (1995 & Supp. 2002) (report of non-compliance/testimony—
workers’ compensation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 6960 (2003) (public
works contracting).
WASHINGTON, D.C.: Washington, D.C. recognizes a public policy
exception to the at-will employment rule. Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702
A.2d 159, 160 (D.C. 1997). District government employees are protected
if they disclose information, including a violation of law or gross
mismanagement, to a supervisor or a public body. D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 1-615.51 to .59 (2001 & Supp. 2004); see also D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 2-223.01 to .07 (2001) (private contractor employees; government
employees not covered by sections 1-615.51 to .59).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-617.04
(2001 & Supp. 2003) (unfair labor practices—labor-management
relations); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-302.08 (2001 & Supp. 2003)
(complaint/disclosure of information to Inspector General); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 2-308.16 (2001) (false claims actions); id. § 2-1402.61
(prohibited acts of discrimination); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-702.07 (2001)
(long-term care); id. § 7-1912 (adult protective services); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 32-507 (2001) (family and medical leave); id. § 32-1010
(minimum wages); id. § 32-1117 (occupational safety and health); id.
§ 32-1542 (testimony—workers’ compensation).
FLORIDA: Florida courts have refused to recognize a public policy
exception to the at-will employment rule. The courts view the creation of
such protection as the proper province of the legislature. Hartley v.
Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327, 1329–30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985). Legislative response includes a Florida whistleblower statute,
which provides protection for all employees, public and private, who
report violations of law. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.3187 (West 2002 &
Supp. 2004) (violations by public agency); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 448.101–.105 (West 2002) (protection for employee reporting
violation of law, rule, or regulation by private employer).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.203
(West 2003) (child abuse—facilities serving children); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 68.088 (West 1997) (False Claims Act); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.57
(West 1999) (testimony in judicial proceeding); FLA. STAT. ANN.
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§ 112.044 (West 2002) (age discrimination); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 395.1041 (West 2002) (emergency care); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 400.0083 (West 2002) (long-term care); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.1051
(West 2002) (workers’ compensation fraud); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 447.501 (West 2002) (unfair labor practices—public employees); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 633.816 (West Supp. 2004) (firefighters); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 651.111 (West 1996 & Supp. 2004) (continuing care providers);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10 (West 1997) (unlawful employment
practices—civil rights); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.1016 (West Supp. 2004)
(report of patient safety data).
Secondary sources: Catherine A. Kyres, Florida Workers’ Whistles
Are Not Silenced, 74 FLA. B.J. 45 (2000); John Sanchez, 2000 Survey of
Florida Public Employment Law, 25 NOVA L. REV. 207 (2000).
GEORGIA: Georgia does not recognize a public policy exception for
private employees. See Eckhardt v. Yerkes Reg’l Primate Ctr., 561
S.E.2d 164, 165–66 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that there is no public
policy exception in Georgia and refusing to allow claim where plaintiffs
were fired for reporting that monkeys were infected with deadly disease
potentially communicable to humans). However, state employees are
protected if they report fraud, waste, or abuse “unless the complaint was
made . . . with the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard
for its truth or falsity.” GA. CODE ANN. § 45-1-4 (2002).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-175
(2001) (child advocate); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-8-60 (2001) (long-term
care facility); id. § 31-8-87 (abuse or exploitation of residents in longterm care facilities); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-5-3 (2004) (sex discrimination
in employment); id. § 34-6a-5 (equal employment for persons with
disabilities); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-2-40 (Supp. 2004) (mental disability
services); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-19-44, 45-19-45 (2002) (fair
employment); id. § 45-22-10 (hazardous chemical protection).
Secondary source: W. Melvin Haas, III et al., Labor and
Employment Law, 54 MERCER L. REV. 369, 374–78 (2002).
HAWAII: Hawaii recognizes a public policy exception to the at-will
employment rule. Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631
(Haw. 1982). Public and private employees are protected if the employee
reports to the employer or a public body violations of law or of contracts
“executed by the State, a political subdivision of the State, or the United
States . . . .” HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-62 (2003); see Whistleblowers’
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Protection Act, id. §§ 378-61 to 378-69; see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 8913 (2003) (prohibited practices—collective bargaining in public
employment).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: HAW. REV. STAT. § 128D-15
(2003) (Hawaii Environmental Response Law); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 377-6 (2003) (unfair labor practices—Hawaii Employment Relations
Act); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (2003) (prohibited discriminatory
practices); id. § 378-26.5 (lie detector tests); id. § 378-32 (testimony—
unlawful suspension or discharge); HAW. REV. STAT. § 387-12 (2003)
(wage and hour law); HAW. REV. STAT. § 388-10 (2003) (payment of
wages); HAW. REV. STAT. § 396-8 (2003) (occupational safety and
health); HAW. REV. STAT. § 398-8 (2003) (family leave).
Case law: Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 879 P.2d 1037, 1046–47 (Haw.
1994) (limiting availability of Parnar claim).
IDAHO: Idaho recognizes a public policy exception to the at-will
employment rule. See Thomas v. Med. Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 61 P.3d
557, 565 (Idaho 2002). Public employees are protected if the employee
reports, in good faith, a violation of law or “any waste of public funds,
property or manpower . . . .” IDAHO CODE § 6-2104 (Michie 2004); see
Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act, id. §§ 6-2101 to 6-2109.
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: IDAHO CODE § 39-4420
(Michie 2002) (hazardous waste management); id. § 39-6214 (PCB
waste disposal); IDAHO CODE § 44-1509 (Michie 2003) (minimum
wage); id. § 44-1615 (farm labor contractors); id. § 44-1702 (wage
discrimination based upon sex); id. § 44-1904 (sanitation facilities for
farm workers); IDAHO CODE § 45-613 (Michie 2003) (claims for wages);
IDAHO CODE § 67-5009 (Michie 2001) (long-term care); id. § 67-5911
(human rights).
Secondary source: Bobbi K. Dominick, What Is the Definition of
“Public Policy” Wrongful Discharge? Time for the Idaho Courts to
Provide Guidance, Without Judicial Legislation, of Public Policy by
Interpreting the Wrongful Discharge Cause of Action, 35 IDAHO L. REV.
285 (1999).
ILLINOIS: Illinois recognizes a public policy exception to the atwill employment rule. See Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d
876, 879–80 (Ill. 1981). Private employees are protected if the employee
reports to a “government or law enforcement agency . . . a violation of a
State or federal law, rule, or regulation.” 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
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174/15 (West Supp. 2004); see Whistleblower Act, id. 174/1–/35 (West
Supp. 2004). Private citizens may bring a qui tam action in the event of
fraud against the government. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 175/1–/8
(Whistleblower Reward and Protection Act) (West 1993 & Supp. 2004);
see also 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/10 (unfair labor practices—
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
415/19c.1 (West 2001) (Executive branch—disclosure of prohibited
activity).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
105/4.04 (West 2001) (long-term care facilities); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/34-2.4c (West 1998) (board of education employees); 115 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14 (West 1998) (unfair labor practices—
educational employees); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/10 (West 2000)
(Community Living Facilities); id. 45/3-318 (Nursing Home Care Act);
id. 45/3-608 (nursing homes); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 85/10.8
(West Supp. 2004) (employment of physicians); id. 86/35 (hospital
employees); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/13 (West 2000)
(agricultural workers); id. 110/17 (migrant workers); 225 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 10/7.2 (West 1998) (employees of licensees subject to Child
Care Act of 1969); id. 705/13.13 (Coal Mining Act); 320 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 20/4.1 (West 2001) (elder abuse and neglect); 325 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9.1 (West 2001) (child abuse and neglect); 415
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/52 (West 1997) (Environmental Protection
Act); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 92/40 (West 2002) (Insurance Claims
Fraud Prevention Act); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 175/1–/8 (West
2002 & Supp. 2004) (Whistleblower Reward and Protection Act); 775
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-101 (West 2001) (civil rights violations);
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/12 (West 1999) (Personnel Record
Review Act); id. 55/15 (Privacy in the Workplace Act); 820 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. id. 105/11 (minimum wage); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
112/10, /35 (West Supp. 2004); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 115/14
(West 1999) (wage payment and collection); id. 125/15 (testimony
before wage board); id. 130/11b (Prevailing Wage Act); 820 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 180/20 (West Supp. 2004) (leave due to domestic or sexual
violence);.820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 220/2 (West 1993) (Safety
Inspection and Education Act); id. 255/14 (Toxic Substances Disclosure
to Employees Act).
Case law: Zielonka v. Topinka, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090–92 (N.D.
Ill. 1998); McGrath v. CCC Info. Servs., Inc., 731 N.E.2d 384, 391–92
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Dana Tank Container, Inc. v. Human Rights
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Comm’n, 687 N.E.2d 102, 104 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
INDIANA: Indiana does not recognize a public policy exception for
private employees. See Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054,
1060–61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). State employees are protected if the
employee reports a violation of law or “misuse of public resources.”
IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-10-4 (Michie 1996); see also IND. CODE ANN.
§ 36-1-8-8 (Michie 2000) (employees of political subdivision).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: IND. CODE ANN. § 4-2-6-13
(Michie 2002) (state ethics commission); id. § 4-13-1.2-11 (department
of correction ombudsman); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-11-1-9.5 (Michie 2001)
(sworn statements to state examiner); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-10-3-11
(Michie 2001) (report of endangered adult); id. § 12-10-13-20 (longterm care); id. § 12-11-13-16 (state wide waiver ombudsman); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-28-9-3 (Michie 1998) (health care facilities); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-41-11-8 (Michie 1993) (training in health precautions
for communicable diseases); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-7.5-1-7 (Michie
1997) (unfair practices—school employees); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-121-8 (Michie 2000) (state educational institution employees); IND. CODE
ANN. § 22-5-3-3 (Michie 1997) (private employer under public
contract); id. § 22-8-1.1-38.1 (Occupational Health & Safety); id. § 229-1-6 (information provided to Civil Rights Commission).
IOWA: Iowa recognizes a public policy exception to the at-will
employment rule. See Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d
275, 281–85 (Iowa 2000). State employees are protected if an employee
reports “a violation of law or rule, mismanagement, a gross abuse of
funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety.” IOWA CODE ANN. § 70A.28 (West 1999 &
Supp. 2004); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 19A.19 (West 2001) (state
personnel); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.10 (West 2001) (Public Employment
Relations); IOWA CODE ANN. § 70A.29 (West 1999) (employees of
political subdivisions).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: IOWA CODE ANN. § 68B.32A
(West 1999) (information provided to Ethics & Campaign Disclosure
Board); IOWA CODE ANN. § 88.9 (West 1996) (occupational safety and
health); IOWA CODE ANN. § 89B.9 (West 1996) (hazardous chemical
right to know); IOWA CODE ANN. § 91A.10 (West 1996) (wage payment
collection); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135C.46 (West 1997) (health care
facilities); IOWA CODE ANN. § 207.28 (West 2000) (coal mining); IOWA

1097

CHERRY ZEN

Washington Law Review

Vol. 79:1029, 2004

CODE ANN. § 216.11 (West 2000) (civil rights); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 235B.3 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004) (dependent adult abuse); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 272C.8 (West 2003) (continuing education); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 729.6 (West 2003) (genetic testing); IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.4
(West 2003) (polygraph examinations).
KANSAS: Kansas recognizes a public policy exception to the at-will
employment rule. See Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685, 689–90 (Kan.
1988). State agency employees are protected if the employee reports a
violation of a state or federal laws, rules, or regulations. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-2973 (1997 & Supp. 2003); see also KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 75-4333 (1997) (public employer and employee relations).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1525
(2000) (child abuse); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-1403 (2000) (dependent
adult abuse); id. § 39-1432 (dependent adult abuse); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-615 (2000) (information provided to secretary of human resources);
id. § 44-636 (unsafe or hazardous working conditions); id. § 44-808
(employer and employee relations); id. § 44-828 (agricultural labor
relations); id. § 44-1009 (discrimination); id. § 44-1113 (age
discrimination); id. § 44-1210 (wages and hours); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 47-852 (2000) (impaired veterinarians); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4928
(2002) (health care—incidents and impaired health care providers);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5430 (2002) (retaliation by board of education
against professional employee); id. § 72-89b04 (school employees
reporting criminal acts); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7313 (Supp. 2003)
(long-term care).
Case law: Connelly v. State Highway Patrol, 26 P.3d 1246, 1255–56
(Kan. 2001).
KENTUCKY: Kentucky recognizes a public policy exception to the
at-will employment rule. See Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401–02
(Ky. 1985). Public employees are protected if they report a violation of
law or “mismanagement, waste, fraud, abuse of authority, or a
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.” KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 61.102 (Banks–Baldwin 2001).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.915
(Banks–Baldwin 1997) (information provided to Legislative Program
Review and Investigations Committee); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 205.8465 (Banks–Baldwin 2001) (public and medical assistance fraud
and abuse); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.170 (Banks–Baldwin 2001)
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(Equal Opportunity Act—disability); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216.541
(Banks–Baldwin 1999 & Supp. 2003) (long-term care); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 216B.165 (Banks–Baldwin 1999) (health care facilities and
services); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.423 (Banks–Baldwin 2003) (wage
discrimination); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.990 (Banks–Baldwin 2001)
(penalties); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 338.121 (Banks–Baldwin 2003)
(occupational safety and health of employees); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 344.280 (Banks–Baldwin 2003) (conspiracy to retaliate—civil rights
violations); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 345.050 (Banks–Baldwin 2003)
(collective bargaining for firefighters); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 351.030
(Banks–Baldwin 1997 & Supp. 2004) (testimony—department of mines
and minerals).
Case law: Palmer v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 882 S.W.2d 117, 120–
21 (Ky. 1994).
LOUISIANA: Louisiana does not recognize a public policy
exception for private employees. See Quebedeaux v. Dow Chem. Co.,
820 So. 2d 542, 545–46 (La. 2002); Gil v. Metal Serv. Corp., 412 So. 2d
706, 708 (La. Ct. App. 1982). Public employees and some private
employees, as defined in section 23:302, are protected if the employee
reports a violation of state law. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:967 (West
1998). Public employees are protected if they make a complaint
concerning a violation of law, waste, or mismanagement. LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36:8 (West 1985 & Supp. 2004); see also LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 42:1169 (West 1990 & Supp. 2004) (public employees).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:13
(West 1995) (employees of insurer); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:312
(West 1998) (age discrimination); id. § 23:352 (sickle cell trait
discrimination); id. § 23:964 (enforcement of labor laws); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 29:404 (West Supp. 2004) (discrimination against
veterans); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:928 (West 1989) (surface coal
mining); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2027 (West 2000) (violation of
environmental laws); id. § 30:2351.55 (lead hazards); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:2009.17 (West 2001) (health care providers); id. § 40:2010.4
(long-term care); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:439.1 (West 1999)
(protection of qui tam plaintiff); id. § 46:440.3 (medical assistance fraud
and abuse); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2256 (West 2003) (conspiracy to
retaliate—human rights).
Case law: Jackson v. Xavier Univ., No. 01-1659, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12890, at **17–18 (E.D. La. July 8, 2002).
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MAINE: Maine does not recognize a public policy exception for
private employees. See Bard v. Bath Iron Works, 590 A.2d 152, 156
(Me. 1991) (“[T]his court has yet to recognize a common law action for
wrongful discharge.”); Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc., 486
A.2d 97, 100 (Me. 1984); Lyons v. La. Pac. Corp., No. 02-29-B-K, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6042, at *9 (D. Me. Apr. 5, 2002). Employees, both
public and private, are protected if the employee reports a violation of a
law or rule or a “condition or practice that would put at risk the health or
safety of that employee or any other individual.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, § 833 (West 1988 & Supp. 2003); see Whistleblowers’ Protection
Act, id. §§ 831–840; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 964 (West
1988) (Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-C (West 1988 & Supp. 2003) (State
Employees Labor Relations Act); id. § 1027 (University of Maine
System Labor Relations Act); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1284
(West 1988) (Judicial Employees Labor Relations Act).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
§ 23 (West 2002) (testimony by state employees to legislative
committees); id. § 4572 (fair employment); id. § 4633 (Human Rights
Act); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1544 (West Supp. 2003) (pursuing
remedy to enforce smoking laws); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1580A (West 2003) (workplace smoking); id. § 4017 (child abuse or neglect);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 570 (West 1988) (occupational safety);
id. § 602 (hours of employment); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 628
(West 1988 & Supp. 2003) (equal pay); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 671 (West 1988) (minimum wage); id. § 847 (family medical leave);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 931 (West 1988 & Supp. 2003)
(information/testimony—State Board of Arbitration); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 1324 (West Supp. 2003) (Agricultural Employees Labor
Relations Act); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 1316 (West 1988 &
Supp. 2003) (employees of public utilities); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
39-A, § 353 (West 2001) (testimony—workers’ compensation).
MARYLAND: Maryland recognizes a public policy exception to the
at-will employment rule. See Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482,
494 (Md. 2002). Executive branch employees are protected if the
employee reports a violation of law, “an abuse of authority, gross
mismanagement, or gross waste of money [or] . . . a substantial and
specific danger to public health or safety.” MD. CODE ANN., STATE
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PERS. & PENS. § 5-305 (1999 & Supp. 2003); see id. §§ 5-301 to -313
(Executive Branch employees); see also MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS.
& PENS. § 2-305 (1997) (state employment).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: Health Care Worker
Whistleblower Protection Act, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. §§ 1-501
to 1-506 (Supp. 2003) (health care workers); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 8318 (1997) (third-party administrators); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL.
§ 3-308 (1999) (equal pay); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 5-604
(occupational safety and health) (1999); MD. CODE ANN., TAX–PROP.
§ 8-214 (2001 & Supp. 2003) (discrimination by country clubs and golf
courses); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. I § 2-103.4 (2001) (Department of
Transportation employees); MD. CODE ANN. art. 28, §§ 2-112.1, 5-114.1
(2003) (collective bargaining—Maryland-National Capital Park and
Planning Commission); MD. CODE ANN. art. 29, § 11.5-110 (2003)
(collective bargaining—Washington Suburban Sanitary District); MD.
CODE ANN. art. 44A, § 2-106 (2003) (collective bargaining—Housing
Opportunities Commission); MD. CODE ANN. art. 49B, § 16 (2003)
(discrimination in employment); MD. CODE ANN. art. 70B, § 5 (2003)
(long-term care).
MASSACHUSETTS: Massachusetts recognizes a public policy
exception to the at-will employment rule. See Shea v. Emmanuel Col.,
682 N.E.2d 1348, 1349–50 (Mass. 1997). Public employees are
protected if the employee reports a violation of law or “a risk to public
health, safety or the environment.” MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 185
(Law. Co-op. 1999); see also id. ch. 150E, § 10 (public employees—
labor relations).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 12,
§ 5J (Law. Co-op. 2000) (false claims actions); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
19A, § 33A (Law. Co-op. 1999) (long-term care); id. ch. 19C, § 11
(Disabled Persons Protection Commission); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111,
§ 72g (Law. Co-op. 1995) (patient abuse, mistreatment, and neglect);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111F, § 13 (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 2003)
(hazardous substances disclosure); id. ch. 112, § 5F (employees of health
care providers); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 51A–B (Law. Co-op.
2002) (child abuse and neglect); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 6D (Law.
Co-op. 1999) (occupational safety and health—asbestos); id. § 24f (age
discrimination); id. § 105B (wage discrimination); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 149, § 148A (Law. Co-op. 1999 & Supp. 2003) (weekly payment of
wages); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 150A, § 3A (Law. Co-op. 1999)
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(domestic service employees); id. ch. 150A, § 4 (unfair labor practice—
labor relations); id. ch. 151, § 19 (minimum wage); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 151B, § 4 (Law. Co-op. 1999 & Supp. 2003) (unlawful
discrimination); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 75B (Law. Co-op. 2000)
(testimony/cooperation—workers’ compensation).
Case law: Brissette v. Franklin County Sheriff’s Office, 235 F. Supp.
2d 63, 92–93 (D. Mass. 2003).
Secondary source: Marybeth Walsh, 1996–97 Annual Survey of
Labor & Employment Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 365, 490–515 (1998).
MICHIGAN: Although Michigan recognizes a public policy
exception to the at-will employment rule, it applies only to a limited
number of cases. See Dudewicz v. Norris-Schmid, Inc., 503 N.W.2d
645, 649–50 (Mich. 1993). Michigan courts have recognized a public
policy cause of action where the statute that forms the basis for the
public policy at issue does not provide a remedy for retaliatory
discharge. Id.; see also Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co.,
265 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978). Thus, a plaintiff reporting
a violation of law cannot maintain a cause of action because the plaintiff
has a remedy under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA). See
Dudewicz, 503 N.W.2d at 650. However, in a case decided prior to the
enactment of the WPA, the Michigan State Court of Appeals held that
the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge based
on his refusal to falsify reports, which would constitute a violation of
law. Trombetta, 265 N.W.2d at 388. The Michigan whistleblower statute
applies to both private and public employers, as the statute defines
“employer” broadly. See Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 15.361–.369 (West 1994).
Area-specific statutes: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 18.1486 (West
1994 & Supp. 2003) (internal auditors); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 37.1602 (West 2001) (Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act); id.
§ 37.2701 (civil rights); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 259.114 (West
Supp. 2004) (audit committee and internal auditor—Airport
Authorities); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.6316, 324.6532 (West
1999) (vehicle emissions testing); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1755
(West 1999) (mental health services); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.16244 (West 2001) (health professional organization employees);
id. § 333.20176a (medical malpractice); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.20180 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003) (employees/contractors of
health facilities and agencies); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.21771
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(West 2001) (nursing homes); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.586j
(West 1997) (long-term care facilities); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 408.395 (West 1999) (minimum wage); id. § 408.483 (payment of
wages and fringe benefits); id. §§ 408.1029, 408.1065 (occupational
safety and health); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.16 (West 2001)
(labor disputes—mediation); id. § 423.210 (labor disputes—strikes by
public employees); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.145p (West Supp.
2003) (vulnerable adults).
Secondary source: Brian D. Young, The Michigan Whistleblowers’
Protection Act: A Look at the Statute and Proposed Modification, 46
WAYNE L. REV. 1691 (2000).
MINNESOTA: Minnesota recognizes a public policy exception to
the at-will employment rule. See Vonch v. Carlson Cos., 439 N.W.2d
406, 408 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). Public and private employees are
protected if they report a violation of state or federal law or rule. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 181.932 (West 1993 & Supp. 2004).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 144.9509 (West 1998 & Supp. 2004) (lead poisoning); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 177.32 (West 1993) (minimum wage); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 179.12 (West 1993 & Supp. 2004) (unfair labor practices—Minnesota
Labor Relations Act); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.13 (West 1993) (unfair
labor practices—Public Employment Labor Relations); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 181.67 (West 1993) (wage discrimination); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 182.654 (West 1993) (occupational safety and health); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 214.19 (West Supp. 2003) (infection control reporting); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 245.94 (West 1992) (ombudsman for mental health);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256.9742 (West 2003) (ombudsman for older
Minnesotans); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 326.244 (West 2004) (electrical
work); id. § 326.81 (Asbestos Abatement Act); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 626.556 (West 2003) (child abuse and neglect); id. § 626.557
(maltreatment of vulnerable adults).
Secondary sources: Jonathan W.J. Armour, Who’s Afraid of the Big,
Bad Whistle?: Minnesota’s Recent Trend Toward Limiting Employer
Liability Under the Whistleblower Statute, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 107
(1995); Neal T. Buethe, Everybody Likes a Tattletale?: The Minnesota
Supreme Court’s Elimination of the “Public Policy” Requirement for
Whistleblower Protection in Anderson-Johanningmier, 29 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 295 (2002).
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MISSISSIPPI: The Supreme Court of Mississippi adopted a public
policy exception to the at-will employment rule in 1993. See McArn v.
Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626 So. 2d 603, 607 (Miss. 1993).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 25-9-171 to 25-9-177 (2003) (public employees providing
information to investigative body or agency); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 43-47-37 (1999 & Supp. 2003) (abuse and exploitation of vulnerable
adults).
Secondary source: Thomas L. Cluff, Jr., Comment, In Defense of a
Narrow Public Policy Exception of the Employment at Will Rule, 16
MISS. C. L. REV. 437 (1996).
MISSOURI: The Missouri Court of Appeals has allowed a public
policy exception to the at-will employment rule. See Luethans v. Wash.
Univ., 894 S.W.2d 169, 171 n.2 (Mo. 1995); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear,
Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 870–77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). State employees are
protected if they report a violation of law or “[m]ismanagement, a gross
waste of funds or abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger
to public health or safety . . . .” MO. ANN. STAT. § 105.055 (West 2003).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: MO. ANN. STAT. § 105.467
(West 2003) (conflicts of interest—lobbying); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 188.105 (West 2003) (complaint/testimony/assistance—regulation of
abortions); MO. ANN. STAT. § 197.285 (West 2003) (hospital and
ambulatory surgical center employees); MO. ANN. STAT. § 198.070
(West 2003) (abuse—nursing homes); id. § 198.090 (misappropriation
of funds—nursing homes); MO. ANN. STAT. § 213.070 (West 2003)
(human rights); MO. ANN. STAT. § 217.410 (West 2003) (inmate abuse);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.525 (West 2003) (minimum wage); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 630.167 (West 2003) (mental health facilities); id. § 630.635
(testimony/information—mental health placement); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 633.135 (West 2003) (testimony/information—mental health
placement or discharge); MO. ANN. STAT. § 660.300 (West 2003) (abuse
and neglect—in-home services); id. § 660.305 (misappropriation of
property—in-home services); id. § 660.608 (long-term care).
Case law: Bachtel v. Miller County Nursing Home Dist., 110 S.W.3d
799 (Mo. 2003).
Secondary sources: James W. Riner et al., Wrongful Discharge of
At-Will Employees in Missouri, 59 J. MO. B. 34 (2003).
MONTANA: Montana is the only state to have abolished the at-will
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rule. It has a wrongful-discharge statute that requires an employer to
show “good cause” for termination. Wrongful Discharge From
Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -915 (2003).
Area-specific whistleblowing statutes: MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 2-18-1001 (2003) (Transportation Department personnel filing
grievances); id. § 2-18-1011 (filing grievances—hearing on complaint);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-401 (2003) (unfair labor practices—public
employees); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-301 (2003) (prohibited
discriminatory practices); id. § 49-3-209(4) (governmental code of fair
practices); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-78-204 (2003) (hazardous chemical
exposure—employee rights). However, these are seemingly irrelevant
because of the good cause requirement.
Secondary source: Marc Jarsulic, Protecting Workers from Wrongful
Discharge: Montana’s Experience with Tort and Statutory Regimes, 3
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 105 (1999).
NEBRASKA: Nebraska recognizes a public policy exception to the
at-will employment rule. See Schriner v. Meginnis Ford Co., 421
N.W.2d 755, 757–59 (Neb. 1988). The State Government Effectiveness
Act protects public employees who report a violation of law, “gross
mismanagement or gross waste of funds, or . . . a substantial and specific
danger to public health or safety.” NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-2703 (1999);
see id. § 81-2705; see also id. § 81-1386 (collective bargaining—state
employees).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-136
(1999) (public accommodations); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-443 (2002)
(safety); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-824 (1998) (prohibited practices—
Industrial Relations Act); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1004 (2002) (age
discrimination); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1114 (1998) (Fair Employment
Practice Act); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1221 (2002) (wage discrimination);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-445 (Supp. 2001) (health care facilities and
services); id. § 71-448 (retaliation by licensed health care facility—
grounds for disciplinary action).
NEVADA: Nevada recognizes a public policy exception to the at-will
employment rule. See Allum v. Valley Bank, 970 P.2d 1062, 1063–64
(Nev. 1998). State and local government employees are protected if they
disclose improper governmental action, which includes violation of state
law or regulation, “abuse of authority[,] . . . substantial and specific
danger to the public health or safety[,] or . . . gross waste of public

1105

CHERRY ZEN

Washington Law Review

Vol. 79:1029, 2004

money.” NEV. REV. STAT. 281.611 (2003); see id. 281.611–.671
(disclosure of improper governmental action); see also NEV. REV. STAT.
288.270 (2003) (government–public employee relations).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: NEV. REV. STAT. 218.5343
(2003) (testimony by state employee before legislature); NEV. REV.
STAT. 289.110 (2003) (peace officers); NEV. REV. STAT. 357.240 (2003)
(false claims); NEV. REV. STAT. 388.531 (2003) (prohibited treatment of
students with disabilities by public school officials); NEV. REV. STAT.
391.632 (2003) (irregularities in testing administration or security); NEV.
REV. STAT. 394.377 (2003) (prohibited treatment of students with
disabilities by private school officials); NEV. REV. STAT. 427A.138
(2003) (facilities for long-term care); NEV. REV. STAT. 433.536 (2003)
(mental health facilities); NEV. REV. STAT. 449.205 (2003) (medical
facilities); id. 449.785 (prohibited treatment of patients with disabilities);
NEV. REV. STAT. 613.340 (2000) (unlawful employment practices);
NEV. REV. STAT. 613.480 (2003) (lie detector tests); NEV. REV. STAT.
618.445 (2003) (occupational safety and health); NEV. REV. STAT.
630.293 (2003) (employees of physicians); NEV. REV. STAT. 633.505
(2003) (employees of osteopathic physicians).
NEW HAMPSHIRE: New Hampshire recognizes a public policy
exception to the at-will employment rule. See Cloutier v. Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1142–43 (N.H. 1981). Under the
Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, private and public employees are
protected if they report a violation of law or rule. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 275-E:1 to :7 (1999 & Supp. 2003).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 141-E:19 (Supp. 2003) (asbestos management and control); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 147-A:12 (Supp. 2003) (hazardous waste management);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:27 (1996) (patient abuse—residential care
and health facilities); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161-F:15 (2002) (elderly
and adult services); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 170-E:12(X),
170-E:35(XII) (2001) (child day care and child-placing agencies—
licensing); id. § 170-E:48 (child day care and child-placing agencies—
retaliation prohibited); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:5 (1999) (Unfair
Labor Practices—Public Employee Labor Relations); id. § 273-C:6(d)
(unfair labor practices—dog and horse racing employees); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 275:40 (1999) (protective legislation—penalties); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 277-A:7 (1999) (toxic substances); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 354-A:19 (1995) (trade and commerce—human rights).
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Case law: Appeal of Fred Fuller Oil Co., 744 A.2d 1141 (N.H. 2000).
NEW JERSEY: New Jersey recognizes a public policy exception to
the at-will employment rule. Ballinger v. Del. River Port Auth., 800
A.2d 97, 108 (N.J. 2002). The New Jersey statute protects both public
and private employees who participate in an investigation or report a
violation of law. See Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to -9 (West 2000).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.13
(West 2002) (child abuse and neglect); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West
2002) (unlawful employment practice—discrimination); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 11A:2-24 (West 2002) (civil service employees); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 18A:17-47 (West 1999) (school employees); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 18A:37-16 (West Supp. 2003) (school employees—harassment,
intimidation, bullying); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:4A-13 (West 2000) (ski
lift and tramway operators); id. § 34:5A-17 (hazardous substances); id.
§ 34:5A-42 (complaint or cooperation with Commissioner—hazardous
substances); id. § 34:6A-45 (worker health and safety); id. § 34:8A-10.1
(seasonal farm workers); id. § 34:11-56a24 (minimum wage); id.
§ 34:11-56.6 (wage discrimination—violations of act); id. §34:11-56.39
(Prevailing Wage Act); id. § 34:11B-9 (Family Leave Act); id.
§ 34:13A-5.4(4) (unfair practices—Employer-Employee Relations Act);
id. § 34:15-39.1 (testimony—workers’ compensation); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:27D-409 (West 2000) (vulnerable adult abuse); id. § 52:27G-14
(ombudsman for institutionalized elderly).
Case law: DeLisa v. County of Bergen, 755 A.2d 578, 582 (N.J.
2000); Donofry v. Autotote Sys., 795 A.2d 260, 288–89 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001).
Secondary sources: A. Michael Barker, Whiners Are Not
Whistleblowers, N.J. LAW., Apr. 2001, at 52; Christopher P. Lenzo, The
Changing Contours of New Jersey Whistleblower Law, N.J. LAW., Apr.
1999, at 51.
NEW MEXICO: New Mexico recognizes a public policy exception
to the at-will employment rule. See Silva v. Am. Fed’n of State, County
& Mun. Employees, 37 P.3d 81, 83 (N.M. 2001).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-7E-19(E) (Michie 2003) (Public Employee Bargaining Act); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 22-10A-33(B) (Michie 2003) (school employees—
violence and vandalism); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (Michie 2000 &
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Supp. 2004) (unlawful discriminatory practice—human rights); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 28-17-19(B) (Michie 2000) (long-term care); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-47-9 (Michie 2004) (Long-term Care Ombudsman Act);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-9-25 (Michie 2000) (occupational health and
safety); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-3-16 (Michie 2000) (radiation
protection).
NEW YORK: New York does not recognize a public policy
exception to the at-will employment rule. Horn v. N.Y. Times, 790
N.E.2d 753, 759 (N.Y. 2003). A private employee is protected if the
employee “discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a
public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer that is in
violation of law, rule or regulation which violation creates and presents a
substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety . . . .” N.Y.
LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 2002). To maintain an action under
section 740, reasonable belief of a violation of law is insufficient; proof
of an actual violation is required. Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 667 N.E.2d
922, 923 (N.Y. 1996). Public employees are protected if they report a
“violation of a law, rule or regulation which violation creates and
presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety;
or . . . which the employee reasonably believes to be true and reasonably
believes constitutes an improper governmental action.” N.Y. CIV. SERV.
LAW § 75-b(2)(a) (McKinney 1999); see also N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW
§ 683 (McKinney 1999) (public employees—grievances).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3028-c
(McKinney 2001) (school employees—acts of violence and weapons
possession); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2004)
(unlawful discriminatory practices—human rights); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 544-a(15)(c) (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2004) (long-term care
facilities); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 27-a (McKinney 2002) (safety and health
standards); id. § 215(1) (labor law violations); id. § 662 (minimum
wage); id. § 680 (minimum wage—farm workers); id. § 704(8) (unfair
labor practices—labor relations); id. § 736 (stress evaluators); N.Y. LAB.
LAW § 741 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2004) (health care employees);
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 880(3) (McKinney 2002) (toxic substances); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-d (McKinney 2002) (complaint of health
care facility resident); id. § 2803-c (health care facilities—patients’
statement of rights); id. § 2803-d (health care facilities—reporting abuse
and neglect); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 460-d(2)(vi) (McKinney 2003 &
Supp. 2004) (residential care facilities—adoption of regulations); N.Y.
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SOC. SERV. LAW § 461-a(3)(b)(iii) (McKinney 2003) (residential care
facilities); N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 120 (McKinney 1994)
(discrimination against employees who bring workers’ compensation
proceedings).
Case law: Bal v. City of New York, 698 N.Y.S.2d 852, 852 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1999).
Secondary source: Joan Corbo, Kraus v. New Rochelle Hosp.
Medical Ctr.: Are Whistleblowers Finally Getting the Protection They
Need?, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 141 (1994).
NORTH CAROLINA: North Carolina recognizes a public policy
exception to the at-will employment rule. See Amos v. Oakdale Knitting
Co., 416 S.E.2d 166, 167 (N.C. 1992); Lenzer v. Flaherty, 418 S.E.2d
276, 287 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992). State employees are protected if they
report a violation of law, fraud, misappropriation, a “[s]ubstantial and
specific danger to the public health and safety,” or “[g]ross
mismanagement, a gross waste of monies, or gross abuse of authority.”
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-84 (2003); see id. §§ 126-84 to 126-88
(improper government activities); see also id. § 126-17 (equal
opportunity violations—state personnel).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-196
(2003) (toxic or hazardous substances); id. §§ 95-240 to 95-245
(retaliatory employment discrimination); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-70.15
(2003) (Medical Assistance Provider False Claims Act); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-335.5 (2003) (school board employees—sexual
GEN.
STAT.
§ 122C-18
(2003)
harassment);
N.C.
(complaint/information—Consumer Advocate); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 143B-181.23 (2003) (long-term care facilities); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 168A-10 (2003) (Persons with Disabilities Protection Act).
Secondary source: Michael McGuinness, North Carolina’s
Developing Public Policy Wrongful Discharge Doctrine in the New
Millennium: Basic Principles, Causation & Proof of Improper Motive,
23 CAMPBELL L. REV. 203 (2001).
NORTH DAKOTA: North Dakota recognizes a public policy
exception to the at-will employment rule. See Ressler v. Humane Soc’y,
480 N.W.2d 429, 431–32 (N.D. 1992). Private employees are protected
if they report a violation of law. N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-20(1)(a)
(Supp. 2003). Public employees are protected if they report a job-related
violation of law or misuse of public resources. N.D. CENT. CODE
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§ 34-11.1-04 (1987 & Supp. 2003).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-02.4-18 (2004) (unlawful discrimination); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 25-01.3-05 (2002) (abuse or neglect of person with a developmental
disability or mental illness); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06-18 (1987)
(minimum wages and hours); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 34-06.1-03, -09
(1987 & Supp. 2003) (equal pay); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-10.1-05
(1999) (long-term care facilities); id. § 50-25.1-09.1 (child abuse and
neglect); id. § 50-25.2-11 (vulnerable adult abuse and neglect).
Case law: Dahlberg v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 625 N.W.2d 241, 250–
56 (N.D. 2001).
OHIO: Ohio recognizes a public policy exception to the at-will
employment rule. See Pytlinski v. Borcar Prods., Inc., 760 N.E.2d 385,
387–88 (Ohio 2002). Public and private employees are protected if they
report a violation of law when “the employee reasonably believes that
the violation either is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an
imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or
safety or is a felony . . . .” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52 (West 2001
& Supp. 2003); see id. §§ 4113.51–.53. In addition, state employees are
protected if they report a violation of law or misuse of public resources.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.341 (West 2002); see also OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4117.11 (West 2001) (unfair labor practice); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4167.13 (West 2001) (public employment risk-reduction
program).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 173.24 (West 2002) (long-term care); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1513.39 (West 1996 & Supp. 2003) (surface mining); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2903.36 (West 1997) (patient abuse and neglect—health
care facilities); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.22 (West 1998) (abuse,
neglect, and misappropriation of property—long-term and residential
care facilities); id. § 3721.24 (abuse, neglect, and misappropriation of
property—retaliatory actions prohibited); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3724.11 (West 1998) (community alternative homes); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 4111.13, 4111.17 (West 2001) (minimum fair wage
standards); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003)
(unlawful discriminatory practices—civil rights); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4723.33 (West Supp. 2003) (nurses and technicians); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4723.34 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003) (reports to board of
nursing/testimony); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4734.31 (West Supp.
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2003) (retaliation against chiropractors); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5101.61 (West 2001) (abuse, neglect, or exploitation of adult); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5104.10 (West 2001) (child care facility employees);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5123.604, 5123.61 (West 2001) (abuse and
neglect of persons with mental retardation and developmental
disabilities).
Case law: Contreras v. Ferro Corp., 652 N.E.2d 940, 944 (Ohio
1995); Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E. 2d 653, 661 (Ohio 1995).
Secondary source: Mark D. Waggoner, Jr., Comment, The Public
Policy Exception to the Employment at Will Doctrine in Ohio: A Need
for a Legislative Approach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1799 (1996).
OKLAHOMA: Oklahoma recognizes a public policy exception to
the at-will employment rule. See Barker v. State Ins. Fund, 40 P.3d 463,
468–70 (Okla. 2001). State employees are protected if they report a
violation of law, mismanagement, gross waste of public funds, abuse of
authority, “or a substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety . . . .” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 840-2.5 (West 2002 & Supp.
2004).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 1430.8, 1430.31 (West 1998) (Group Homes for Persons with
Developmental or Physical Disabilities Act); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 7103 (West 1998 & Supp. 2004) (child abuse and neglect); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1601(1) (West 1987) (discriminatory practices);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 199 (West 1999) (protection of labor); id.
§ 403 (occupational health and safety); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1832 (West 2004) (Residential Care Act); id. § 1-1916 (Nursing Home
Care Act); id. § 1-1939 (employees under Nursing Home Care Act); id.
§ 1-2215 (long-term care); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 5 (West 1992 &
Supp. 2004) (testimony—workers’ compensation).
Secondary source: M. Derek Zolner, Note, Employment Law: Report
a Crime, Lose Your Job: The Oklahoma Supreme Court Reins in the
Public Policy Exception in Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 50 OKLA. L. REV.
585 (1997).
OREGON: Oregon recognizes a public policy exception to the atwill employment rule. See Dunwoody v. Handskill Corp., 60 P.3d 1135,
1142 (Or. Ct. App. 2003). It is an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to retaliate against an employee for certain conduct, such as
reporting “criminal activity by any person . . . .” OR. REV. STAT.
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§ 659A.230 (2001). Public employees are protected if they report a
violation of law, “[m]ismanagement, gross waste of funds or abuse of
authority or substantial and specific danger to public health and safety
resulting from action of the state, agency or political subdivision,” or
“that a person receiving services, benefits or assistance from the state or
agency or subdivision, is subject to a felony or misdemeanor warrant for
arrest . . . .” Id. § 659A.203; see Whistleblower Law, id. §§ 659A.200–
.224; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 243.672 (1999) (unfair labor
practices—public employee collective bargaining).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: OR. REV. STAT. § 185.170
(1999) (testimony by members of Oregon Disabilities Commission); OR.
REV. STAT. § 430.755 (1999) (adult abuse); OR. REV. STAT. § 441.057
(1999) (health care facilities); id. § 441.127 (long-term care facilities);
id. § 441.655 (resident abuse—long-term care facilities); OR. REV.
STAT. § 443.765 (1999) (adult foster homes); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 464.280(3) (1999) (violations of law—gambling operations); OR. REV.
STAT. § 652.220 (1999) (wage discrimination); id. § 652.355; OR. REV.
STAT. § 653.060 (1999) (minimum wage); OR. REV. STAT. § 654.062
(1999) (occupational safety and health); OR. REV. STAT. § 657.260
(1999) (testimony—unemployment compensation); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 658.452 (1999) (farm labor employees); id. § 658.760 (farmworker
camps); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030 (2001) (unlawful employment
practices—discrimination); id. § 659A.233 (reporting certain violations;
testifying at unemployment compensation hearing); id. § 659A.236
(legislative testimony); id. § 659A.259 (employee housing); OR. REV.
STAT. § 663.120 (1999) (unfair labor practices—labor relations).
PENNSYLVANIA: Common law protection does not extend to a
whistleblower who is not under a legal duty to report. Donahue v. Fed.
Express Corp., 753 A.2d 238, 244 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). The
Whistleblower Law protects private and public employees who report
wrongdoing or waste. Whistleblower Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§§ 1421–1428 (West 1991).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6311
(West 2001) (child abuse); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5004 (West 1992 &
Supp. 2003) (unfair educational practices—Pennsylvania Fair
Educational Opportunities Act); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 4112 (West
Supp. 2004) (environmental laboratory employees); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
35, § 6020.1112 (West 2003) (Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act); id.
§ 7130.509 (low-level waste facilities); id. § 7313 (Worker and
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Community Right to Know Act); id. § 10225.302 (Older Adult
Protective Services Act); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.307 (West
Supp. 2004) (protection of health care workers—patient safety plan
requirement); id. § 1303.308 (health care workers—reporting of serious
events and incidents); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.6 (West 1992)
(unfair labor practices—labor relations); id. § 333.112 (testimony—
minimum wage); id. § 336.8 (wage discrimination); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 955 (West 1991 & Supp. 2004) (unlawful discriminatory
practices—human relations); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1201 (West
1991) (unfair practices—public employee relations); id. § 1301.606
(seasonal farm workers); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1431 (West Supp.
2004) (commercial motor vehicle safety); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§ 4000.1714 (West 1997) (Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and
Waste Reduction Act); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1015.1 (West Supp.
2004) (water and wastewater system employees); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65,
§ 1108 (West 2000) (ethics standards commission); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
66, § 3316 (West 2000) (public utility employees); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
71, § 733-1104 (West Supp. 2004) (employees of companies licensed by
Department of Banking); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1619 (West 1996)
(commercial motor vehicle safety).
Case law: Jakomas v. McFalls, 229 F. Supp. 2d 412, 421–26, 430–31
(W.D. Pa. 2002).
RHODE ISLAND: Rhode Island does not recognize a public policy
exception. Pacheo v. Raytheon Co., 623 A.2d 464, 465 (R.I. 1993) (per
curiam). However, The Rhode Island Whistleblowers’ Protection Act
protects private and public employees and independent contractors
reporting violations of law. The Rhode Island Whistleblowers’
Protection Act , R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-50-1 to -9 (2003).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-29-15
(1999) (unprofessional conduct, incompetence, or negligence of a
podiatrist); id. § 5-31.1-9 (unprofessional conduct or negligence of
dentists and dental hygienists); id. § 5-37-1.5 (unprofessional conduct or
negligence of physicians); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-1.1-14 (2001)
(occupational health); id. §§ 23-17.8-4 to -5 (abuse in health care
facilities); id. § 23-17.14-29 (Hospital Conversions Act); id. § 23-24.5.11 (asbestos abatement); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-45 (2002) (retaliation
by insurance companies against medical services providers); id. § 27-1937 (retaliation by nonprofit hospital service corporations against medical
services providers); id. § 27-20-32 (retaliation by nonprofit medical
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service corporations against medical services providers); id. § 27-41-46
(retaliation by HMOs against medical services providers); id. § 27-54-7
(Insurance Fraud Prevention Act); id. § 27-63-1 (health care fraud); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7 (2003) (unlawful employment practices—fair
employment); id. § 28-6-21 (wage discrimination); id. § 28-7-13 (unfair
labor practices—Labor Relations Act); id. § 28-12-16 (minimum wage);
id. § 28-14-18 (payment of wages); id. § 28-20-21 (occupational safety);
id. § 28-21-8 (testimony—Hazardous Substances Right-To-Know Act);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-27-6 (1997) (abuse of persons with
developmental disabilities); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-66.7-8 (1998) (longterm care).
SOUTH CAROLINA: South Carolina recognizes a public policy
exception to the at-will employment rule. Ludwick v. This Minute of
Carolina, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 213, 216 (S.C. 1985). Public employees are
protected if they report wrongdoing or waste. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-2710 to -50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2003).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-13-80
(Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 2003) (unlawful employment practices—
state human affairs commission); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-80 (Law. Coop. Supp. 2003) (testimony—workers’ compensation); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 41-15-510 (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 2003) (occupational health and
safety).
SOUTH DAKOTA: South Dakota recognizes a public policy
exception to the at-will employment rule. See Dahl v. Combined Ins.
Co., 621 N.W.2d 163, 166–67 (S.D. 2001). Public employees who are
subjected to retaliation for reporting a violation of state law may file a
grievance. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-6A-52 (Michie 2004); see also id.
§ 3-18-3.1 (unfair practices—public employees’ unions).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 20-13-26 (Michie 1995) (human rights); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 27B-8-43 (Michie Supp. 2003) (abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a
person with a developmental disability); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 28-145.7 (Michie 1999) (Older Americans ombudsman program); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 60-9A-12 (Michie 2004) (unfair practices—collective
bargaining); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-11-17.1 (Michie 1993) (wage
complaints and proceedings); id. § 60-12-21 (wage discrimination).
TENNESSEE: Tennessee recognizes a public policy exception to the
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at-will employment rule. See Guy v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 79 S.W.3d
528, 534–35 (Tenn. 2002). Public and private employees are protected if
they refuse to remain silent about an illegal activity. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 50-1-304 (1999 & Supp. 2003). State employees enjoy protection if
they report various activities, such as a violation of law, fraud, and
misappropriation. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-116 (2002).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-18-105
(Supp. 2003) (false claims actions); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-301
(1998) (human rights); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-603 (2002)
(communication with an elected official by a public employee); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 33-2-416 (2001) (mental health and developmental
disabilities services and facilities); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-410 (2001)
(child abuse); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-609 (2002) (collective
bargaining—education employees); id. § 49-50-1409 (Education Truth
in Reporting and Employee Protection Act of 1989); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 50-2-202 to -206 (1999) (wage discrimination); id. §§ 50-3-106, -409
(occupational safety and health); id. § 50-3-2012 (Hazardous Chemical
Right to Know Law); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-11-804, -903 (2001 &
Supp. 2003) (nursing homes); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-183 (1995)
(false or fraudulent Medicaid claims); id. § 71-6-105 (abuse of certain
adults).
Case law: Griggs v. Coca-Cola Employees’ Credit Union, 909
F. Supp. 1059, 1062–65 (E.D. Tenn. 1995).
TEXAS: Texas does not recognize a “common-law whistleblower
cause of action.” City of Midland v. O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 215
(Tex. 2000). Public employees are protected if they report a violation of
law. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 554.001–.010 (Vernon 1994 & Supp.
2004).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN.
§ 125.013 (Vernon 1995) (Agricultural Hazard Communication Act);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.110 (Vernon 2002) (child abuse and
neglect); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 142.0093 (Vernon
2001) (home health, hospice, and personal assistance services); id.
§ 161.134 (health care facilities); id. § 242.133 (nursing homes and
related institutions); id. § 242.655 (cooperation with long-term care
legislative oversight committee); id. § 247.068 (assisted living facilities);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 252.132 (Vernon 2001 & Supp.
2004) (intermediate care facilities); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 502.017 (Vernon 2003) (Hazard Communication Act); TEX. HUM.
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RES. CODE ANN. § 36.115 (Vernon 2001) (Medicaid fraud prevention—
private actions); id. § 101.064 (long-term care facilities); TEX. LAB.
CODE ANN. § 21.055 (Vernon 1996) (employment discrimination); id.
§§ 411.081–.083 (use of telephone hotline to report occupational safety
or health violation); id. § 451.001 (testimony and claims—workers’
compensation); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 160.006 (Vernon 1999)
(county employees—grievances); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 160.012
(Vernon 2004) (reports concerning physicians); id. § 301.413 (reports
concerning nurses; nurse reports of patient care issues); id. § 303.009
(nursing peer review); id. §§ 505.602–.603 (social workers—incidents
harmful to clients).
Case law: Gold v. City of College Station, 40 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. App.
2001); Austin v. HealthTrust, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. 1998);
Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex.
1990); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 734 (Tex.
1985) (creating “very narrow exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine,” but requiring plaintiff “to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that his discharge was for no reason other than his refusal to
perform an illegal act”).
UTAH: Utah recognizes a public policy exception to the at-will
employment rule. See Rackley v. Fairview Care Ctrs., Inc., 23 P.3d
1022, 1026–27 (Utah 2001). Public employees are protected if they
report a violation of law or waste. Utah Protection of Public Employees
Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 67-21-1 to -9 (2000).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-20-8
(2001) (unfair labor practices—employment relations and collective
bargaining); id. § 34-23-402 (employment of minors); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 34-28-19 (2001 & Supp. 2004) (payment of wages); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 34A-6-203 (2001) (occupational safety and health); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 62A-3-207 (2000) (long-term care).
VERMONT: Vermont recognizes a public policy exception to the atwill employment rule. See Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 588 (Vt.
1986).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 961
(2003) (unfair labor practices—State Employees Labor Relations Act);
id. § 1026 (unfair labor practices—Judiciary Employees Labor Relations
Act); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1427 (2002) (smoking in the workplace);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 231–232 (2003) (occupational safety and
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health); id. § 473 (parental and family leave); id. § 491 (employment
rights for reserve and national guard members); id. § 494d (Polygraph
Protection Act); id. § 495 (unlawful employment practices—fair
employment); id. § 1621 (State Labor Relations Act); VT. STAT. ANN.
§ 1726 (1987 & Supp. 2003) (unfair labor practices—Vermont
Municipal Labor Relations Act); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4920 (2001)
(child abuse); id. § 6909 (abuse of vulnerable adults); id. § 7508 (longterm care).
VIRGINIA: Virginia recognizes a public policy exception to the atwill employment rule, but the state’s courts have thus far rejected its
application to a “generalized, common-law ‘whistleblower’ retaliatory
discharge claim.” Dray v. New Mkt. Poultry Prods., Inc., 518 S.E.2d
312, 313 (Va. 1999).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-3000
to -3004 (Michie 2001) (state employees grievance procedure); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17 (Michie Supp. 2003) (report of patient safety
data to patient safety organization); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1507
(Michie 2003) (local government employees—grievance procedure);
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-125.4 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003) (hospitals);
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-138.4 (Michie 2001) (nursing facilities); VA.
CODE ANN. § 40.1-51.2 (Michie 2002) (participation in safety and health
inspection); id. § 40.1-51.2:1 (occupational safety and health); VA. CODE
ANN. § 51.5-39.10 (Michie 2002) (complaints and investigations
concerning persons with disabilities); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-515
(Michie 2002) (asbestos, lead, and home inspection contractors and
workers); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1730 (Michie 2002) (assisted living
and adult day care facilities; child welfare agencies); id. § 63.2-1731
(abuse and neglect at assisted living facilities, adult day-care centers, or
child welfare agencies); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-308 (Michie 2002)
(testimony and current or future claims—workers’ compensation).
WASHINGTON: Washington recognizes a public policy exception
to the at-will employment rule. See Dicomes v. State, 113 Wash. 2d 612,
617, 782 P.2d 1002, 1006 (1989) (en banc). State employees are
protected if the employee reports improper governmental action to the
office of the state auditor. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.40.010–.910 (2004);
see also WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.110 (2004) (unfair labor practices—
state collective bargaining); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.41.010–.902
(2004) (local government whistleblower protection).
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Area-specific whistleblower statutes: WASH. REV. CODE
§ 18.20.185 (2004) (boarding homes); id. § 18.51.220 (nursing homes);
id. § 18.88A.230 (nursing assistants, community based care settings, and
in-home service agencies); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.30.190 (2004)
(employees of farm labor contractors and agricultural employers);
WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.52.073 (2004) (unfair labor practices—
community colleges); WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.140 (2004) (public
employees filing unfair labor practice charge); id. § 41.59.140 (unfair
labor practices—Educational Employment Relations Act); id.
§ 41.76.050 (unfair labor practices—higher education faculty); WASH.
REV. CODE § 43.06A.085 (2004) (family and children’s ombudsman);
id. § 43.70.075 (quality of care by health care provider); id. § 43.190.090
(long-term care facilities); WASH. REV. CODE § 47.64.130 (2004) (unfair
labor practices—ferry system); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.12.130 (2004)
(testimony—primarily concerning wages and working conditions); id.
§ 49.12.287 (sick leave; care of family members); id. § 49.17.160
(industrial safety and health); id. § 49.26.150 (asbestos); id. § 49.46.100
(minimum wage); id. § 49.60.210 (unfair practices—discrimination); id.
§ 49.78.130 (family leave); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.124.100 (2004)
(nursing homes and state hospitals); WASH. REV. CODE § 73.16.032
(2004) (employment of veterans); WASH. REV. CODE § 74.34.180 (2004)
(abuse of vulnerable adults); id. § 74.39A.060 (long-term care facilities).
WEST VIRGINIA: West Virginia recognizes a public policy
exception to the at-will employment rule. See Feliciano v. 7-Eleven,
Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713, 718 (W. Va. 2001). Public employees are protected
if they report wrongdoing or waste. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6C-1-1 to -8
(Michie 2003).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-9
(Michie 2002) (unlawful discriminatory practices); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-6-12 (Michie 2003) (nursing homes); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-5C-8
(Michie 2001) (nursing homes); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-5D-8 (Michie
2001 & Supp. 2004) (assisted living residences); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-5L-18 (Michie 2001) (long-term care); id. § 16-5N-8 (residential
care communities); id. § 16-32-14 (asbestos abatement); id. § 16-39-4
(health care workers); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-1A-4 (Michie 2002)
(unfair labor practices—private sector labor relations); id. § 21-3A-13
(occupational safety and health); id. § 21-5B-3 (wage discrimination); id.
§ 21-5C-7 (wages and hours); id. § 21-5E-3 (wage discrimination—state
employees); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-31 (Michie 2002) (Surface Coal

1118

CHERRY ZEN

Employee Whistleblowing After Sarbanes–Oxley
Mining and Reclamation Act); id. § 22A-1-22 (miners and authorized
representatives).
Case law: Wiggins v. E. Assoc. Coal Corp., 357 S.E.2d 745, 747–48
(W. Va. 1987).
WISCONSIN: Although Wisconsin recognizes a public policy
exception to the at-will employment rule, there is no broad protection for
whistleblowers. See Hausman v. St. Croix Care Ctr., 571 N.W.2d 393,
397–98 (Wis. 1997). The case protects only whistleblowers terminated
for refusing an employer’s command to violate public policy or for
acting pursuant to an affirmative legal obligation. Id. State employees
are protected if they report a violation of law, mismanagement, abuse of
authority, substantial waste, or a danger to public health and safety. WIS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 230.80–.89 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003); see also WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 895.65 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003) (government employee
protection).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 16.009
(West 2003) (board on aging and long-term care); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 21.80 (West 2003) (reemployment after national guard, state defense
force, or public health emergency service); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 46.90
(West 2003 & Supp. 2003) (elder abuse and neglect); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 50.07 (West 2003 & Supp. 2003) (care and service residential
facilities); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 50.54 (West 2003) (rural medical centers);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.61 (West 2003) (mental health patients’ rights);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0903 (West 2003) (municipal prevailing wage and
hour scales); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 101.055 (West 2004) (occupational
safety and health); id. § 101.595 (toxic substances, infectious agents, or
pesticides); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.13 (West 2002) (proceedings
concerning open records); id. § 103.33 (street trades of minors and
recovery of wages); id. § 103.49 (wage rate on state work); id. § 103.83
(regulation of employment of minors); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 104.10 (West
2002) (testimony—investigation or proceeding concerning minimum
wages); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 109.03 (West 2002) (payment of wages—
claims and collections); id. § 109.07 (layoffs and business closings); id.
§ 109.075 (cessation of health care benefits); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.06
(2002) (unfair labor practices—Employment Peace Act); id. § 111.322
(employment discrimination); id. § 111.36 (sex discrimination in
employment); id. § 111.37 (lie detector tests); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.375 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003) (providing limited anonymity for
complainant in employee discrimination cases); WIS. STAT. ANN.
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§ 289.42 (West 2004) (solid and hazardous waste facilities).
WYOMING: Wyoming recognizes a narrow public policy exception
to the at-will employment rule. See McLean v. Hyland Enters., 34 P.3d
1262, 1268–69 (Wyo. 2001). State employees are protected if they
report a violation of law, fraud, waste, gross mismanagement, or a
danger to health or safety. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-11-103 (Michie 2003).
Area-specific whistleblower statutes: WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-1308
(Michie 2003) (long-term care facilities); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 19-11-104
(Michie 2003) (discrimination in employment—uniformed services
members); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-4-304 (Michie 2003) (equal pay); id.
§ 27-11-109 (occupational health and safety); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-2910 (Michie 2003) (health care facilities).
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APPENDIX B
This Appendix summarizes the federal laws—other than the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act—that either directly address whistleblowing or
relate to employee disclosure of information that furthers the public
welfare. The statutes are broken down by categories, such as
environmental protection, that best summarize the underlying policy the
whistleblowing provision is thought to protect.
As suggested by this list of statutes, the current federal regulatory
approach is piecemeal. If an employee blows the whistle on a specific
type of violation, then that employee is protected from retaliation by
federal law. If an employee blows the whistle on a violation of a statute
that is not listed below, then that employee has no federal protection and,
depending on the vagaries of state law, may have no remedy whatsoever.
The National Whistleblower Center, a non-profit group that advocates
on behalf of whistleblowers, has pointed out this weakness in the law
and is lobbying to have a broad federal protection for whistleblowers
enacted. The text of the Center’s model act can be found at
http://www.whistleblowers.org/html/model_whistleblower_law.html
(last visited Oct. 7, 2004). It is worth noting that such a model act would
be also be beneficial on a state level to provide employees uniform
protections.
Banks and Banking: 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(q) (West 2001)
(employees of RTC, Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board, and
RTC contractors); 12 U.S.C. § 1790b (2000) (federal credit unions); id.
§ 1831j (depository institution employees).
Employment: 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2000) (unfair labor practices—
National Labor Relations); id. § 215(a)(3) (fair labor standards); id.
§ 623(d) (age discrimination); id. § 660(c) (occupational safety and
health); id. § 1140 (Employee Retirement Income Security and Welfare
and Pension Plans Disclosure Acts); id. § 1855(a) (migrant and seasonal
agricultural workers); id. § 2002 (lie detector tests); id. § 2615(b)
(family and medical leave); 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (2000) (mine safety and
health); 33 U.S.C. § 948a (2000) (testimony—longshore and harbor
workers’ compensation); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000) (civil rights—
equal employment opportunities); id. § 12203(a) (equal opportunity for
individuals with disabilities); 46 U.S.C. § 2114(a) (2000) (seamen).
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Environmental/Public Health and Welfare: 15 U.S.C. § 2622(a)
(2000) (toxic substances control); id. § 2651 (asbestos hazard emergency
response); 20 U.S.C. § 3608 (2000) (asbestos in school buildings); id.
§ 4018 (asbestos in school buildings); 30 U.S.C. § 1293(a) (2000)
(surface mining control and reclamation); 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000)
(water pollution prevention and control); 42 U.S.C. § 289b(e) (2000)
(funding of research); id. § 300j-9(i) (safety of public water systems); id.
§ 5851 (nuclear whistleblower protection); id. § 6971 (solid waste
disposal); id. § 7622 (air pollution); id. § 9610 (hazardous substances).
Federal Government Employment: 2 U.S.C. § 1316 (2000)
(employment of veterans); id. § 1317 (Congressional Accountability Act
of 1995); 3 U.S.C. § 417 (2000) (covered employees—Presidential
Offices); 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214, 1221–1222 (2000) (remedies—prohibited
personnel practices); id. § 2302(b)(8)–(9) (prohibited personnel
practices); id. § 2303 (prohibited personnel practices—FBI employees);
id. § 7116(a)(4) (unfair labor practice—agency employees); 22 U.S.C.
§ 4115(a)(4) (2000) (unfair labor practices—Department of State); 50
U.S.C.A. § 2702 (West Supp. 2004) (Department of Energy).
Fraud/False Claims: 18 U.S.C. § 1031(h) (2000) (major fraud
against the United States); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2000) (false claims
actions).
Health Care: 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(i) (2000) (hospital employees); id.
§ 1997d (Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act); id. § 3058g(j)
(state long-term care ombudsman program—eligibility for funding).
Immigration: 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(C)(iv) (2000) (labor condition
application—H-1B status for alien); id. § 1324b(a)(5) (unfair
immigration-related employment practices).
Military: 10 U.S.C. § 1034(b) (2000) (retaliatory personnel actions
against military personnel); id. § 2409 (military contractor employees);
38 U.S.C. § 4311(b) (2000) (members of the uniformed services).
Safety/Transporation: 46 U.S.C. app. § 1506(a) (2000) (shipping);
49 U.S.C. § 20109(a) (2000) (railroad carrier employees); id. § 31105(a)
(commercial motor vehicle safety); id. § 42121(a) (airline employees);
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49 U.S.C.A. § 60129(a) (West Supp. 2004) (pipeline safety).
Miscellaneous: 22 U.S.C. § 3664 (2000) (Panama Canal
Commission); 31 U.S.C. § 5328 (2000) (monetary transactions); 41
U.S.C. § 265(a) (2000) (contractor employees).
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